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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Overview 
 The goal of this study is to develop a decision-making methodology which takes 
into account how multiple adversary (thief, saboteur, terrorist, etc.) teams may attack a 
facility and assist facility operators in designing protection systems to defend against 
such attacks.  This results in the ability for the facility operator to assess relative facility 
and/or infrastructure safety, and make decisions regarding how to optimally allocate 
resources in physical protection elements to balance cost and performance.  These 
physical protection elements enable the facility owner to prevent attacks through 
deterrence and to defeat the adversary (through detection, delay and response) if he or she 
chooses to attack. 
 
1.2 Physical Protection Systems 
 A physical protection system (PPS) integrates people, procedures and physical 
safeguards to protect facilities against theft, sabotage, or other malevolent actions.  The 
concept of physical protection systems was developed in 197255 and later revised by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency56 and explored in great detail at Sandia National 
Laboratories40.  PPS’s include detection, delay, and response safeguards that help to 
protect against an adversary threat.  Detection involves discovering an attempted or 
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actual intrusion in a facility and includes items such as exterior and interior sensors and 
entry control.  In order to be successful, detection must be accompanied by assessment of 
the alarm, which is often provided through a mechanism such as closed circuit television, 
to indicate whether or not the alarm was genuine or false.  Delay involves slowing 
adversaries until the response force can arrive, and it includes items such as barriers, 
fences, and walls, which inhibit the adversary.  Delay time should be sufficient enough to 
allow for security personnel to respond in time to interrupt the adversary before 
completing his or her malevolent act.  Finally, response involves the response force 
tasked with interrupting the adversary once his or her presence has been detected.  Both 
on-site and off-site security personnel contribute to the ability to thwart potential 
attackers by timely response.  As can be expected, a more rapid response is necessary in 
the case of sabotage (if the goal of the response force is to prevent the adversary from 
accessing the target) than theft. 
 Concepts of PPS were originally developed with nuclear facilities in mind, but 
they are equally applicable to any facility that requires protection from an adversary 
threat.  The ultimate objective of a nuclear physical protection system is to prevent the 
theft of nuclear materials or sabotage of nuclear materials or facilities.  Theft and 
sabotage can be prevented in two ways: by deterring the adversary such that an attack is 
not attempted or by defeating an adversary once an attack has begun.  Deterrence is 
achieved by a thorough and balanced physical protection system that is viewed as too 
difficult to defeat by adversaries40,54,55,56.  That is, the measures in place to defeat the 
adversaries are too numerous and powerful for the adversary to attempt an attack, 
rendering the target unattractive. 
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 To prevent against theft, the objective is to protect against unauthorized 
individuals gaining access to the intended target and removing it from the facility.  In 
sabotage, however, the goal of denial of access is to prevent the adversary from ever 
gaining access to the material, whereas the goal of denial of task is to prevent the 
adversary from committing an act of sabotage.  Although the two objectives share similar 
concepts, the strategy to stop an adversary in each situation is different.  To protect 
against some theft targets, one strategy is to use delay measures in close proximity to the 
target to stall the adversary long enough for the security personnel to call for help or to 
stop the adversary themselves.  To protect against some sabotage targets, however, delay 
is necessarily far away from the target, to allow sufficient time for on-site security 
personnel to interrupt the attack and prevent the adversary from gaining access to the 
target. 
 In order to protect against these threats, the designer of a physical protection 
system should keep the following concepts in mind: defense in depth, minimum 
consequence of component failure, balanced protection, and graded protection.  Defense 
in depth ensures that there are multiple safeguards in place to stop an adversary 
regardless of which path or attack strategy he or she chooses to employ.  Defense in 
depth slows down an attacker by requiring they defeat multiple PPS elements to achieve 
their goal, ensuring facility protection in the event of the defeat of a single safeguard 
element.  
 Related to defense in depth is the concept of minimum consequence of component 
failures.  Contingency plans must be developed which allow the security system to 
continue to operate in the event a safeguard within the system is lost.  An example of this 
 4 
would be an emergency backup generator that starts automatically once a primary power 
source is disabled.  Incorporating minimum consequences of component (i.e. safeguard 
components or response force personnel) failure, however, can be costly as additional 
components add to the installation and operating costs of the facility. 
 Balanced protection refers to the concept that an adversary should be hindered by 
PPS elements independent of what attack strategy and path he or she chooses.  A 
completely balanced system would require an equal amount of time to commit theft or 
sabotage independent of the route chosen.  This is not likely to be possible due to budget 
and physical constraints, nor is it necessarily desirable.  Certain elements within the 
system may have large inherent delays built into them, such as walls, while other 
components may not have as large of a delay time, such as a chain link fence.  However, 
all elements should provide a sufficient level of security for the facility.  The goal of a 
well-designed PPS is to provide adequate protection against all threats on all possible 
paths, while being mindful of practical constraints such as cost and reliability.   
 Graded protection refers to the concept that a facility should be protected in a 
level that is commensurate with its importance, or consequence of loss.  Facilities whose 
loss, theft, or destruction would cause harm on a national level should be protected to a 
higher level of security than a facility that is of no national consequence.  Determining 
which facilities are the most important involves ranking of the facilities according to their 
threat level and protecting them accordingly.  This decision is made at an administrative 
level, such as in the Departments of State and Homeland Security.  Further guidance on 
the topic of PPS is provided by IAEA56 and Garcia40. 
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 Nuclear reactor facility operators typically use the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission’s (NRC) Design Basis Threat (DBT) as a method of determining what level 
of safeguards is sufficient.  The DBT requirements1,2 describe general adversary 
characteristics, including group size and capabilities, which nuclear facility operators 
must be prepared to defend against.  These requirements are set by the NRC and include 
protection against radiological sabotage and theft of nuclear material.  Facilities use the 
DBT to establish what safeguards are necessary for protection.  Following the September 
11, 2001 attacks, the NRC conducted thorough reviews of security procedures and 
standards to ensure that nuclear facility practices were adequate given the escalating 
terrorist threat.  After its review, the NRC realized some of its requirements were 
inadequate.  In 2003, the NRC issued an updated DBT guideline2 which stressed the need 
for enhanced security procedures at critical facilities.  After two years of implementation 
and observation, the NRC felt that these rules should be more generically imposed to 
include more facilities on certain license classes.  This decision was based on adversary 
trend analysis and input from Federal law enforcement and the intelligence community.  
In 2005, a new report was issued by the NRC which reflected these observations, 
including enhanced adversary capabilities79.  Improvements deemed necessary by the 
NRC report included giving consideration to “the potential for attack on facilities by 
multiple coordinated teams of a large number of individuals”79 and attacks from multiple 
locations.   
 However, since the current DBT guidelines1,79 do not account for a multiple team 
attack threat, current facility operators are not required to design for this threat.  Thus, 
their current PPS designs are may prove to be insufficient to handle the increasingly 
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complicated scenarios when multiple adversary teams operate in collaboration.  This 
study develops a methodology to defend against such scenarios. 
 
1.3 Game Theory and PPS 
 The above section discussed the basic concepts of physical protection systems 
without consideration for the impact that adversarial and response force decision making 
has on PPS design.  Analyzing how the facility operator needs to design the PPS for a 
real world situation, where the conflict between adversarial and response forces is 
involved, can use the concept of game theory80.  Research in the area of game theoretic 
network interdiction done by Washburn and Wood102 is used to develop the methodology 
in this study.  Assuming that the adversary and the facility operator are all-knowing with 
regards to a networked facility, (that is, they know the arc travel times, detector locations, 
etc.) the adversary will always choose the path which optimizes his or her objectives (e.g. 
minimum travel time through the facility, minimum probability of detection, etc.), that is, 
the optimal path.  This assumption is based on the idea of game theory for a repeated 
game, and it assumes that the adversary’s and facility owner’s strategies are static and do 
not change with time.  Overall, the adversary wants to maximize his or her objective, 
while the interdictor wants to minimize that same objective.  Washburn and Wood102 
show that these conflicting objectives result in a zero sum game situation in a network in 
which the objective of interest for the interdictor is to minimize the maximum flow.  This 
zero sum game strategy can easily be adapted to any objective, e.g. maximizing travel 
time or maximizing the probability of effectiveness in defeating the adversary.  The 
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problem of maximizing the utility of the security system (as defined in Section 3.2) is 
addressed in the example problems throughout this study. 
 The reasoning behind choosing the optimal path is that the adversary knows 
where all the safeguards have been placed throughout the facility, so it is to his or her 
best advantage to take the route which best achieves his or her goal.  One may argue that 
if the interdictor knows the adversary will take the optimal path, he or she will spend his 
or her money on safeguarding the optimal path.  This would, however, result in a new 
path being optimal, and, the adversary would not choose the previous optimal path for 
travel.  Since the equilibrium state between the two forces is for the adversary to travel 
along the optimal path, it is the interdictor’s goal, then, to ensure that the adversary’s 
objective function value along the optimal path is above a threshold value either to deter 
the adversary from attempting an attack, or to ensure the adversary will be defeated if he 
or she chooses to attack.   
 It is in the best interests of the interdictor to attempt to ensure that all possible 
paths through the facility have objective function values above the threshold value.  This 
concept is further discussed by the IAEA56 and Garcia40, as well as in the previous 
section as the theory of balanced protection. 
 
1.4 Research Objectives 
 The background presented in Sections 1.1-1.3 provides motivation for this study, 
which consists of the following four objectives in order to ultimately develop a 
methodology to assist facility operators in protecting facilities against multiple adversary 
team threats: 
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1. Develop a conceptual framework for computing system effectiveness. 
2. Develop an optimization under uncertainty methodology for facility protection 
against a single adversary team attack. 
3. Extend the single adversary methodology to handle multiple team attacks. 
4. Demonstrate the usefulness of the completed methodology by applying it to problem 
of large scale complexity. 
 Knowing that adversarial threats are real and escalating, facility owners must seek 
ways to develop an effective PPS to protect their critical facilities.  Objective 1 of this 
study, pursued in Chapters II and III, establishes a problem framework that allows a 
facility owner to develop a PPS for a new facility, perform trade-off analyses to 
determine the relative merit of differing PPS upgrades, and analyze existing systems to 
determine if a facility’s PPS is performing as expected.  Incorporating these three tasks 
simultaneously is an improvement of this study as current methods focus on either 
facility design or analysis.  Chapter II provides a discussion of current metrics for system 
effectiveness and potential approaches for evaluating facility system effectiveness.  The 
purpose of Chapter III is to discuss the features of the facility protection optimization 
problem and develop a solution framework for the problem. 
 Once a mathematical formulation has been developed, Objective 2, pursued in 
Chapter IV, develops the details of solving the complete facility protection optimization 
under uncertainty problem which can handle a single adversary team attack.  The 
methodology utilizes an efficient first-order reliability method based approach to 
incorporating stochastic behavior, allowing for a larger number of random variables to be 
incorporated than in previous studies.  Additionally, the methodology presented in 
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Chapter IV incorporates conflict between adversarial and facility guard forces and timely 
detection, concepts that are previously omitted from facility protection methodologies.  
Finally, the approach presented in Chapter IV presents a novel approach to decoupling 
adversary critical path selection and safeguards optimization.  All of the contributions of 
this study allow for realistic (larger scale) problems to be analyzed. 
 Following the conceptual and mathematical development of a single adversary 
facility protection methodology, Objective 3, pursued in Chapter V, extends the single 
adversary team methodology developed in Objectives 1 and 2 to handle multiple team 
attacks.  This is a significant development of this study as a mathematical methodology to 
combat multiple adversary team attacks against a facility does not currently exist.  The 
purpose of this task is to ensure the capabilities of the developed methodology are 
commensurate with the expected threat level present in the world currently. 
 An underlying goal of this study is to develop a methodology that can handle 
analysis of a large scale problem.  Garcia41 has provided a detailed description of a 
realistic facility which can be used to evaluate the methodology developed in Objectives 
1-3.  Objective 4, pursued in Chapter VI, investigates the usefulness of the complete 
facility protection methodology by applying it to a real world problem.  Demonstrating 
the capability to analyze a large scale problem is also an important development in this 
study as current methods require significant computational effort that is prohibitive to 
analyzing these problems. 
 Chapter VII summarizes the conclusions of the study and provides 
recommendations for future research. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS 
 
 The first objective of this study relates to measuring whether or not a facility’s 
PPS is providing an adequate level of protection against an adversarial attack.  This 
measure is referred to as system effectiveness.  Although there is no universally accepted 
definition, system effectiveness is defined in this study as the degree to which a system, 
defined as a set of interrelated components working together to achieve a common goal, 
meets their overall designed purpose.  This definition is intentionally vague as the system 
being analyzed helps to dictate what measure of effectiveness is appropriate.  System 
effectiveness can also be thought of as a performance measure (metric).  Section 2.1 
discusses the metrics for system effectiveness used in this study, including a discussion 
on combining conflicting objectives.  Section 2.2 describes current methods for 
computing system effectiveness, including their advantages and disadvantages.  The 
chapter ends with a summary in Section 2.3. 
 
2.1 Typical System Effectiveness Metrics 
 Any metric on which a system’s performance can be evaluated can be used to 
assess system effectiveness.  Depending on the application, a specific metric may be 
preferred.  For example, facility throughput and efficiency may be important measures to 
a line manager at a manufacturing facility while reduction of casualties and minimum 
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exposure to harm may be important to the commander of a military operation.  While the 
objective of a specific system dictates which measure is most important, cost and system 
performance often act as the two most prominent metrics in PPS design54.  These two 
metrics are naturally competing as increased cost is typically required in order to achieve 
improved system performance.  As a result, the goal of the designer is to develop a 
system which optimally balances cost and performance. 
 Metrics may be employed at the system, component, or group of components 
level.  For example, the manager of a facility may wish to know the cost of the facility’s 
entire physical protection system, whereas the security force manager may focus only on 
the costs of the security personnel. 
 Further discussion of cost and performance is provided in Sections 2.1.1-2.1.2, 
respectively. 
 
2.1.1 Cost 
 Cost is often a driving factor in many organizations and it can therefore have a 
direct impact on system effectiveness.  Throughout this study, costs are treated as life 
cycle costs for the safeguards, including related installation, operation, and maintenance 
costs.  These costs are assumed to be deterministic.   
 When making decisions regarding safeguards’ expenditures, the analyst must 
decide if additional safeguards are cost effective.  That is, is the additional cost of added 
safeguards a justified investment?  In order to make this decision, the analyst must 
perform a tradeoff between cost and performance, which is discussed in the next section. 
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2.1.2 Performance 
 Performance may be proportional to cost (at least initially, if the safeguards’ 
budget is spent wisely, until the point of diminishing returns), thus, the objective of 
maximizing performance competes directly with minimizing cost.  Performance can be 
measured in many different ways, but for the purposes of PPS design, performance is 
considered in terms of the probability of security system effectiveness (PE) and the 
probability of security system failure (PFS = 1-PE).  This failure can be measured in terms 
of specific failure of a component of the system, as total system failure, or as failure to 
meet some performance threshold.  Any of these measures provides insight to the system 
designer and operator in designing/operating the system.  The following section discusses 
PE and its components further. 
2.1.2.1 Probability of System Effectiveness 
 There are many strategies available to an adversary to achieve his or her goal, 
which is to travel his or her chosen attack path with the least likelihood of being defeated, 
or the highest likelihood of succeeding40.  The adversary can choose a brute force attack 
to minimize the time required to complete his or her actions, with little regard to the 
probability of being detected.  Conversely, the adversary may choose a stealth attack to 
minimize detection probability along a path without regard to travel time.   
 Effectiveness measures are available to deal with either of the adversarial 
approaches.  To deal with a brute force attack, the cumulative delay time along the path 
(Tmin) is compared with the guard’s response time (TG).  An adequate PPS allows for the 
guards to have ample time to respond to an incident.  In this case, the minimum delay 
along the remaining segments of the path (TR) should be greater than or equal to the 
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guard response time.  This can be achieved by either reduced guard response times (by 
assigning a larger guard force to the facility) or by increasing the delays along the 
adversary’s path (by installing barrier safeguards).  The disadvantage of this approach is 
that it does not adequately address the issue of detection.  Without detection, the delay is 
meaningless, as the response force will not be alerted to the adversary’s presence. 
 To deal with a stealth attack, the cumulative probability of detection (Pmin) of the 
adversary is analyzed.  An effective system results in a Pmin that is above an acceptable 
threshold level.  This can be achieved by installing detectors throughout the facility.  The 
disadvantage of this approach is that it does not consider the resulting delay time 
necessary for guard force response.  Without delay elements to slow the adversary, 
detection is meaningless as the guard force may not have adequate time to interrupt the 
adversary. 
 Referring to the aforementioned methods, Garcia states: “Due to the deficiencies 
of each of these measures, neither delay time nor cumulative probability of detection 
alone is the best measure of system effectiveness.  A better measure of effectiveness is 
timely detection, which combines Pmin, Tmin, and TG.”
40 
 The point where the remaining minimum delay along the adversary path just 
exceeds the guard response time is referred to as the critical detection point (CDP).  The 
probability of interruption (PI) is the cumulative probability of detection from the path’s 
start up to the CDP, and it serves as the basis of Sandia National Laboratories’ Estimate 
of Adversary Sequence Interruption (EASI) model10,40 for calculating system 
effectiveness.  PI is noted to be different than Pmin as it does not represent the detection 
across the entire path.  The timelines over which PI and Pmin, as well as TG and TR, are 
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calculated are illustrated in Figure 2-1.  PI itself is often used as a measure of system 
effectiveness as it represents timely detection.  There is a limitation to this approach as 
timely detection only includes detection, delay, and guard response time.  It does not 
include any resulting conflict between the guard force and the adversaries, represented 
through the probability of neutralization, PN.  PN refers to the probability that the 
facility’s guard force will defeat the adversary if a physical confrontation occurs (i.e. if 
the adversary does not surrender once interrupted).  Simulation tools99 and analytical 
approximations15 exist to determine the results of such conflicts.  Determination of PN is 
discussed in detail further in Section 3.2.1.3.  Garcia includes detailed discussion on the 
calculation of PI, along with some examples
40.  In the methodology presented in this 
dissertation, PN is incorporated, however the time required for neutralization is assumed 
to be negligible. 
 
 
Note: CDP is defined such that TG ≤ TR 
Figure 2-1: Illustration of Timely Detection 
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 It is worth noting that the location of the CDP is influence by the adversary’s 
objectives.  If the adversary’s goal is to simply enter a facility and commit an act of 
sabotage such as a suicide bomber, the CDP is earlier in the path as the adversary task 
time is reduced.  Conversely, if the adversary’s goal is theft, his or her total task time 
increases and the security force has more time to respond to his or her detection, thus the 
CDP is later. 
 Garcia also uses PI as part of another measure of system effectiveness
40, that is 
dependent on the adversary being identified as an outsider or an insider.  Outsiders are 
individuals who have no special insight into the operations of the facility, while insiders 
(e.g. facility workers) have some intimate knowledge of, access to, and authority at the 
facility which gives them an advantage when attacking the facility.  If the attacker is an 
outsider, system effectiveness, PE, is calculated as PE outsider = 1-(1-PI*PN)
103.  If the 
attacker is an insider, the equation becomes more complicated.  That is because the 
insider typically does not act abnormally when trying to commit theft or sabotage until he 
or she is detected or feels threatened, at which point he or she acts like an outsider.  
System effectiveness for insiders is calculated as PE insider = PICP*PN,NV + (1-PICP)*PE 
outsider.  PICP is the probability of interruption up to the insider compromise point (ICP).  
Until the ICP, the insider acts like any other individual associated with the facility so as 
not to create suspicion of his or her intentions.  It is worth noting that the ICP is an 
insider-dependent point.  Some insiders will feel threatened earlier on and thus become 
violent whereas others will stay calm for a longer period of time40.  The latter makes his 
or her probability of interruption much lower as his or her motives are not immediately 
obvious.  PN,NV is the probability of neutralization for a nonviolent (NV) individual until 
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the ICP.  Until the ICP, the insider is likely to be nonviolent if his or her motives are 
discovered.  PE insider and PE outsider offer a structured approach to determining whether or 
not a PPS provides sufficient protection against an adversarial threat. 
 Insider attacks are considered outside the scope of this study, and therefore, only 
outsider attacks are considered.  All equations are developed with this simplification in 
mind.  Future work should consider extending this methodology to include insider 
attacks. 
 Previous facility protection work has concentrated on adversaries choosing the 
path with the least probability of interruption40 and probability of detection81.  The former 
study lacks a formal mathematical methodology to analyze a facility and the latter lacks 
the inclusion of timely detection.  Both methods lack inclusion of the probability of 
neutralization.  Inclusion of neutralization is important when dealing with a multiple team 
attack in order to account for scenarios in which the adversary attacks the facility with a 
large number of individuals, thereby overwhelming the guard response force.  Since no 
previous mathematical methodology exists which deals with a multiple team attack, it is 
natural that previous methodologies ignore the inclusion of PN, as it adds complexity to 
the analysis.  Simply analyzing this type of scenario by looking at PI is inadequate as the 
response force may be able to interrupt the adversary force, but if they are greatly 
outmatched, they will not be able to neutralize them.  Neutralization can no longer be 
assumed to be successful with a multiple team attack as the size of the adversarial force 
may be very large.  As a result, PE is chosen over PI as a superior measure of the 
performance of the PPS system. 
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2.2 Methods for Computing System Effectiveness 
 Section 2.1 discussed the system effectiveness metrics for evaluating the PPS.  
The purpose of this section is to review current practices for analyzing system 
effectiveness.  The goal of any analysis of security system effectiveness is to meet the 
three capabilities outlined in Section 1.4, that is, to be able to design a new system, 
perform an upgrades analysis (which can be thought of as a new system design with a 
reduced budget), and analyze the performance of an existing system.  Following is a 
discussion of the different methods available for computing system effectiveness.  Some 
of these methods are currently utilized for system effectiveness analysis, while others can 
be adapted to be used for this purpose.  Each method includes a brief introduction, as well 
as a discussion of its ability to meet the outlined objectives, and any advantages or 
disadvantages specific to the method. 
 
2.2.1 Attack Trees/Graphs 
 The fault tree method is a graphical enumeration of the ways in which component 
failures can lead to a system failure23,35,95,100.  Fault trees are often used to analyze critical 
facilities, such as nuclear reactors100.  Further, Schneier95 coined the term “attack tree” to 
mean a specific type of fault tree in which the failure in question is a malevolent attack 
by an adversary.  A reliability block diagram3,52,91 is a particular type of fault tree where 
the goal is to evaluate overall system reliability.  These techniques involve a top-down 
evaluation of a particular facility.  The analysis begins by generating a list of possible 
attacker goals.  Each goal is the root (top) node of a separate tree.  Next, the analyst 
enumerates all likely possible attacks against the goals and populates the trees.  Once an 
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attack tree has been constructed, the likelihood of the top event can be computed.  If the 
top node is formulated as PE, then system effectiveness can be calculated. 
 This method is advantageous due to its simplicity of implementation and the large 
amount of previous work using attack and fault trees23,35,95,100.  Additionally, many 
potential attack strategies can be captured in a single attack tree and the resulting analysis 
can identify the most vulnerable path as that path with the lowest value of system 
effectiveness.  There are two distinct disadvantages, however.  This method appears to be 
best suited for PPS analysis of a set of potential attack strategies, but it is not appropriate 
for security system design.  Further, while attack trees have been used to solve similar 
problems, they have not been utilized for PE calculation.  Inclusion of multiple teams, 
conditional probabilities, timely detection, etc., results in an inability to use attack trees. 
 
2.2.2 Adversary Path Analysis 
 The approach explored by Garcia40 focuses on the existence of adversary paths.  
An adversary path represents an ordered series of actions which, if completely 
successfully, execute an act of theft or sabotage.  Figure 2-2 shows a sample adversary 
path to destroy a pump in an industrial facility. 
 The adversary path analysis method repeats the PI (or PE) calculation for many 
paths in the facility and compares these values to one another to find the path of the 
greatest system vulnerability (i.e. the path with the lowest PI (or PE)).  The analysis can 
be quite cumbersome without a formal methodology for which paths to analyze.  If the 
lowest PI (or PE) path is deemed unacceptable, system upgrades must be explored in 
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order to improve the system.  Garcia also includes numerous examples for analyzing 
identified system upgrades40. 
 
 
Figure 2-2: Sample Adversary Path
40
 
 
 The advantage of this method is that it provides a methodology for analyzing 
facility system effectiveness and is in fact currently used in this manner40.  The 
disadvantage of this method is that it requires separate enumeration of candidate 
adversary paths.  As a result, this method provides an appropriate analysis tool, but it 
does not provide design capabilities. 
 
2.2.3 Network Representation 
 Network (or graph) representations involve translating a facility into a network 
much the way it is done for attack trees, although in this case the nodes typically 
represent physical locations within the system (rather than states) and the arcs some 
measure of connectivity between the locations (rather than actions to transition between 
 20 
states) such as travel time or cost (in dollars) to travel between nodes.  The network is 
then analyzed simultaneously from the perspective of the adversary, who is trying to 
defeat the facility, and the facility owner, who is trying to protect the facility.  Well-
established mathematical approaches exist for handling network representations of 
facilities3.  Network representations provide for a structured approach to analyzing 
networks and making decisions, and they have been employed extensively to analogous 
problems as the design and analysis of security systems, although not using the same 
effectiveness metrics as are desired in this study26,38,46,59,60,77,81,87,94,104. 
 Network representations are an ideal choice for adversary path selection as they 
have been utilized to solve analogous problems such as shortest path and minimum flow 
routing through networks3.  Currently, problems in which maximization of minimum PE 
is the desired objective have not been explored using these methods.  As a result, they 
appear well suited for PPS design and analysis if previous studies can be extended to 
utilize this metric. 
 
2.2.4 Dynamic systems 
 While the methodology presented in this study does not include dynamic 
behavior, it is important to realize that this is a potential extension to this dissertation.  
Petri nets61,74,84,85,86 and agent based simulation34,105 may be used to address dynamic 
aspects of the facility.  A Petri net is an abstract, formal model of information flow.  They 
model distributed systems as a directed bipartite (or separable) graph.  Advantages of 
Petri nets include the ability to handle dynamic behavior and multiple simultaneous 
events84, which may be useful in this methodology.  Their application, however, appears 
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to be better suited for analysis than for design.  Agent-based systems also provide a 
technique for analyzing dynamic systems.  In these systems, agents are computer systems 
that are programmed with logic (i.e. rules concerning beliefs, desires, etc.) and they are 
capable of making independent decisions based on this logic.  Adversary and response 
force actions could be simulated using agents.  Similarly to Petri nets, however, agent-
based systems appear to be best suited for analysis and not for design. Additionally, 
dynamic systems are outside the scope of this study. 
 
2.2.5 Method Choice 
 All of the methods of computing system effectiveness mentioned in Sections 
2.2.1-2.2.4 offer particular advantages and disadvantages for system effectiveness 
calculation.  A summary of these methods is provided in Table 2-1. 
 Ultimately the goal of this chapter is to select or create a problem representation 
framework which is able to analyze an existing PPS, design a PPS for a new facility, and 
perform a PPS upgrades analysis using a user-defined effectiveness metric.  No one 
current method meets all of these criteria, and thus, the only way to achieve this goal is to 
develop a method which is a combination of the approaches found in Sections 2.2.1-
2.2.4.  Attack trees, adversary path analysis and dynamic systems are inappropriate for 
security system design, while graph theory representation, attack trees, and dynamic 
systems methods do not currently utilize PE as a metric for system effectiveness.  As a 
result, the methodology presented in this study incorporates a combination of the security 
system analysis capabilities of adversary path analysis with the design capabilities of 
graph theory.  Adversary path analysis is a natural choice for incorporation in this 
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methodology given its current use as an analysis tool for physical protection systems.  
Graph theory complements adversary path analysis by providing a methodology that is 
capable of identifying vulnerable adversary paths (given the analysis capabilities of 
adversary path analysis).  Further, the time-expanded aspect of dynamic systems is 
outside the scope of this study and therefore unnecessary, and attack trees do not appear 
useful given their limitations.  Future work may include developing a methodology that 
combines the methodology developed in this dissertation with dynamic systems.  This 
potential extension is discussed in Chapter VII. 
 
Table 2-1: Summary of System Effectiveness Methodologies 
Problem 
Representation 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Attack Trees/Graphs - Many potential attack 
methods can be captured in 
one tree 
- Best suited for analysis and not 
design 
- Inclusion of multiple teams, 
conditional probabilities, 
timely detection, etc., results 
in inability to use attack trees 
Adversary Paths - Designed specifically for 
existing security system 
effectiveness evaluation and 
therefore seems most ideal 
for this application 
- Best suited for analysis and not 
design 
- Only appropriate when 
potential adversary attack path 
is known 
Networks - Suitable for new system 
design or existing system 
analysis 
- No methods currently exist 
which utilize PE as a measure of 
system effectiveness 
Petri Nets/Agent 
Based Simulation 
- Able to handle dynamic 
systems and multiple 
simultaneous events 
- Useful for complicated event 
analysis 
- More appropriate for analysis 
than design 
- Dynamic systems not included 
in scope of study 
- No methods currently exist 
which utilize PE as a measure of 
system effectiveness 
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2.3 Summary 
 This chapter provided an overview of both system effectiveness metrics and 
problem representation frameworks.  Probability of system effectiveness and cost were 
identified as primary metrics for facility system effectiveness measurement.  Several 
types of approaches to represent the problem were investigated for use in calculating the 
system effectiveness metrics, and networks and adversary paths were found useful.  
Adversary paths were found to be useful for analysis since they are currently utilized for 
this purpose, while networks were found to be useful for their versatility in handling 
different optimization objectives and capabilities (design and analysis).  These concepts 
will be used in the following chapter, where the problem features of facility protection 
optimization are discussed and utilized to develop a problem solution framework. 
 24 
CHAPTER III 
 
PROBLEM SOLUTION FRAMEWORK 
 
 The previous chapter discussed system effectiveness measures and potential 
frameworks to evaluate these measures.  The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the 
features of the facility protection optimization problem and to develop a general solution 
framework for this problem.   The chapter begins with the development of a network 
representation in Section 3.1.  A general problem formulation utilizing this network 
representation is then discussed in Section 3.2.  Section 3.3 discusses how network 
interdiction concepts can be utilized to solve this problem formulation.  A discussion of 
the approach for handling stochastic behavior in the formulation is provided in Section 
3.4.  Finally, a summary of the chapter is provided in Section 3.5. 
 
3.1 Network Representation 
 A graphical representation of the relationship between the elements or actions in 
the system, referred to as a connectivity diagram (CD), is developed first in order to 
facilitate calculation of the objective discussed in the previous chapter.  Throughout this 
study, the terms network and CD are used interchangeably.  For this step, the idea is to 
analyze the facility through the eyes of the adversary and determine how he or she would 
attempt to achieve his or her objectives.  If a subject matter expert for the system is 
available, which is often the case when an upgrades’ analysis is being performed rather 
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than a new system design, or the system is not overly complicated, a task-based CD 
should be constructed.  If no subject matter expert is available and the system is overly 
complicated, a location-based CD should be constructed, as this formulation allows for 
greater flexibility at a cost of lost accuracy (since the information incorporated involves 
greater uncertainty).  The following discussion of CD development is provided as a brief 
overview but it is not intended to be exhaustive.  That is, complete development of a CD 
is outside the scope of this study and is understood to be undertaken by a facility 
operations’ subject matter expert40.  
 
3.1.1 Task-Based Connectivity Diagram 
 For a task-based CD, the diagram should be constructed with arcs representing 
actions and nodes between them representing milestones or physical locations.  Actions 
should reflect how to transition from one milestone or location to another.  If two rooms 
in a facility are represented by nodes on a CD, the arcs between them should indicate the 
links between the nodes (i.e. a door between the rooms or a hallway).  The final node 
should be the milestone of adversary mission success.  An example of a task-based CD is 
shown in Figure 3-1.  The values shown on the arc represent the expected value for the 
action, in terms of the effectiveness metric.  In this example, the numerical values in 
Figure 3-1 are in terms of detection probability.  This example is based on the scenario 
presented in Figure 2-2 in Section 2.2.2, with the addition of “bribe guard” as a way to 
transition from the node of outside the facility to the node of inside the fence. 
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Figure 3-1: Task-Based Connectivity Diagram 
 
3.1.2 Location-Based Connectivity Diagram 
 For a location-based CD, the diagram is constructed with nodes representing 
physical locations within the facility.  The existence of an arc between two nodes 
indicates that there is a method by which to transition from one node to the other, i.e. 
there would be an arc between two nodes if there is a physical connection between them.  
The arc values represent the best-known estimate for the transition (e.g. travel time) 
between nodes.  Since location-based CD’s are often constructed based on less 
information than task-based CD’s (since they are for new projects and have no subject 
matter experts), these estimates can be very approximate.  If no other data is available, an 
estimate of arc values can be made based on relative distances between nodes.  In order 
to do this, the largest physical distance between two nodes in the CD is given a value of 1 
and the smallest distance, 0, and all intermediate values are interpolated based on 
distance of that particular arc vs. the longest distance.  This method is appropriate for 
travel time and detection probability (PD), quantities which are needed for safeguards’ 
analysis.  Additionally, it should be noted that no specific method for transitioning 
between nodes is specified, as in task-based CD’s.  That is to say, if there are two 
transition measures between two specific nodes, only one arc connects these nodes.  For 
instance, rather than having two arcs transitioning between “outside facility” and “inside 
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fence” as in Figure 3-1, the average of the two detection probabilities from this task-
based CD has been used in the location-based CD shown in Figure 3-2.  Additionally, 
other approaches such as the minimum value or the geometric mean could be used.  Also, 
since location-based CD’s are based on less information than task-based CD’s, in the 
example shown in Figure 3-2 it is assumed that less data is available for the transitions 
between “inside outer door” and “inside wall” and between “inside wall” and “at pump.”  
Since less information is available, the values in this example between these nodes are 
assumed to be more conservative than those present in Figure 3-1.  In general, location-
based CD’s will be more conservative as the values used to generate them are typically 
less certain than equivalent task-based CD’s and conservative assumptions are made to 
generate data to populate the CD. 
 
 
Figure 3-2: Location-Based Connectivity Diagram 
 
 Since actions cannot be reflected in a location-based CD, the values reflected in a 
location-based CD are likely to be less accurate than a task-based CD.  For instance, the 
probability of detection for transitioning from inside the wall to being adjacent to the 
pump (and sabotaging it) is only reflected as one value in the location-based CD (Figure 
3-2), whereas the task-based CD (Figure 3-1) reflects the actions of both penetrating the 
door to arrive at the pump and destroying the pump.  This distinction is important to keep 
in mind when deciding to use either a task-based or location-based CD. 
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3.1.3 Hybrid Connectivity Diagram 
 Another option for creating a CD involves a hybrid of task-based and location-
based CD’s to describe the facility in question.  This is often a useful alternative when the 
designer has some data, but not enough to accurately create a task-based CD, but he or 
she wants more detail and accuracy than a location-based CD provides.  In order to 
implement this method, the designer collects as much data as is available and populates a 
CD with this information.  The gaps in the tasks present in the CD are represented as they 
would be in a location-based CD, with the best estimate available for the arcs.  An 
example based on Figure 3-1 is shown in Figure 3-3.  In this case, data were not available 
for the transitions between “Inside Outer Door” and “Inside Wall” and “Inside Wall” and 
“At Pump,” so they were replaced with best-known estimates, as in Figure 3-2.   
 
 
Figure 3-3: Hybrid Connectivity Diagram 
 
 This concept of connectivity diagrams allows for a simple representation of a 
facility and/or adversary actions which facilitates the methodology developed in this 
dissertation.  In addition to identifying the objectives and constraints and constructing a 
CD, several other quantities must be specified in order to completely define the problem 
prior to undertaking a PPS design.  These additional inputs are discussed in the following 
section. 
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3.1.4 Problem Inputs 
 While the CD is helpful for representation purposes, it needs to be translated into 
an arc-node incidence matrix for use in analysis and design.  This matrix is a sparse 
matrix, with directed arc names as column headings, node names as row headings, a 1 in 
the matrix if the arc leaves from the corresponding node, a -1 if the arc enters the 
corresponding node, and 0 elsewhere.  Additionally, a node balance matrix must be 
constructed.  This is a matrix with arc names as row headings, a 1 at the origin of the CD, 
a -1 at the destination, and 0 elsewhere.  Figure 3-4 shows a sample directed network 
graph.  The nodes in the graph (and all other network graphs in this study, unless 
otherwise noted) are numbered in no particular order, with “O” representing the origin of 
the facility (instead of 1) and “D” representing the destination in the graph (instead of the 
terminal node number).  Table 3-1 and Table 3-2 show the arc-node incidence matrix and 
node balance matrix, respectively, corresponding to Figure 3-4.  More information on 
these concepts can be found in Ahuja3. 
 
O
2
3 4
5 D
 
Figure 3-4: Sample Network 
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Table 3-1: Sample Arc-Node Incidence Matrix 
 O-2 2-3 2-4 3-5 4-D 5-D 
O 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2 -1 1 1 0 0 0 
3 0 -1 0 1 0 0 
4 0 0 -1 0 1 0 
5 0 0 0 -1 0 1 
D 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 
 
Table 3-2: Sample Node Balance Matrix 
O 1 
2 0 
3 0 
4 0 
5 0 
D -1 
 
 
 
 The next step in defining the problem is to identify the safeguards’ options 
available for the PPS.  This definition includes the cost, detection probability, and travel 
time associated with the individual safeguard if it were to be installed.  Safeguard 
definition also includes identifying whether or not the safeguard is a response force 
safeguard.  This is an important distinction as guards help to increase both PI and PN. 
 Also, the uninterdicted (or initial, that is, including all installed safeguards, if an 
upgrades analysis or current system analysis is being performed) PD (detection 
probability) and Tt (travel time) for each arc, an adjacency matrix of travel times between 
arcs, baseline guard response time (this corresponds to on-site guards if they exist, or off-
site response force if not), and the number of potential origins and destinations in the 
problem must be specified.  Typically the number of origins and destinations is one, but 
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in the event the problem includes multiple origins and destinations, this must be 
identified prior to analysis. 
 The final piece of information required to completely define the problem is the 
number of adversary teams considered in the analysis and, if the number of adversary 
teams is greater than one, their effect on one another.  The number of teams should reflect 
the threat the facility is accurately expected to face and not simply an overly-conservative 
estimate.  The reason for this is the safeguards’ cost associated with protecting against 
adversary teams increases dramatically as the number of teams does.  Experiments 
showing these results are presented in Sections 5.2 and 5.3.  If the number of adversary 
teams is greater than one, the helper team detection factor (HTDF), helper team time 
factor (HTTF), simultaneous primary team detection factor (STDF), and simultaneous 
primary team time factor (STTF) must be specified.  These four factors help to describe 
the influence multiple adversary teams have on one another and they must be specified at 
the outset of the problem.  They are discussed in detail in Section 5.1.2. 
 The following section discusses how these inputs are translated into a 
mathematical problem formulation. 
 
3.2 Problem Formulation 
 For the remainder of this study, G = ( O , A ) denotes a directed network with 
node set O and arc set A.  Arcs are referred to by a single index, i or j, where i,j ∈ A.  
Throughout, s and t (with s ≠ t) indicates origin and destination, respectively.  With 
regards to safeguards, S represents the set of safeguard types, l. 
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 A methodology is needed to simultaneously optimize Cost and PE objectives since 
they are both considered important measures of system effectiveness and their associated 
design objectives are conflicting.  In order to combine the metrics present in the facility 
protection problem (cost, in dollars and PE, in probability), the objectives must be non-
dimensionalized.  As mentioned earlier (see Section 2.1.2), probability of failure, PFS = 1 
– PE is used here, so that cost and performance are both minimization objectives.  Then, 
Cost and PFS can be combined as follows: 
22
)(min)(max
)(min
)(min)(max
)(min
1 







−
−
+







−
−
−=
nFS
N
nFS
N
nFS
N
nFS
n
N
n
N
n
N
n
nPPS
PP
PP
CostCost
CostCost
Utility  (3-1) 
where n is an index representing the current Cost and PFS values, and N is the set of all 
possible n’s (i.e. Pareto points).  This equation calculates a non-dimensionalized distance 
from the origin for both Cost and PFS (the expression beneath the square root) such that 
the point closest to the origin represents the optimal value of UtilityPPS (see Figure 3-5, 
where PFS* and Cost* represent non-dimensionalized PFS and Cost, respectively) and 
then subtracts it from unity so that the above objective is a maximization objective.  This 
combined metric for system effectiveness will be utilized throughout this study. 
 The general optimization problem to be solved in this study, then, is to maximize 
nPPS
Utility , as defined in Eq. (3-1), as: 
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Figure 3-5: Illustration of maximum UtilityPPS point 
 
 Considering the stochasticity in variables such as time to traverse each arc, guard 
response time, detection probabilities of the safeguards, delay time increases as a result of 
the safeguards, and the location in the path where the adversary is detected, the problem 
in Eq. (3-2) may be re-stated probabilistically as 
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where the performance constraint and objective are no longer deterministic; that is, they 
now include stochastic behavior, and cost is assumed to be deterministic.  Assuming cost 
is deterministic and linear is a limitation of this methodology as discounts may apply for 
purchasing multiple safeguards of a particular type together.  Additionally, costs will vary 
over time as safeguards deteriorate and require additional maintenance. 
 The problem in Eq. (3-3) looks similar to the problems solved in the field of 
reliability-based design optimization (RBDO) for mechanical systems.  Research in such 
Cost* 
maximum UtilityPPS point 
(optimal point) 
Minimum distance 
PFS* 
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problems over the past two decades has resulted in several techniques for probabilistic 
analysis and optimization that are much more efficient than the Monte Carlo-based 
optimization methods typically used in the stochastic network interdiction literature. 
Therefore, this study combines the concepts of network interdiction with reliability-based 
design optimization techniques, to allow for a PPS design which efficiently and 
effectively incorporates uncertainty.   
 Further discussion of the calculation of PFS and Cost is provided in the next 
section.  A discussion of uncertainty analysis techniques is provided in Section 3.4, while 
a complete solution methodology to solve this formulation is discussed in detail in 
Chapter IV.  The following section discusses the calculation of Cost and PFS, quantities 
that occur in the objective and constraints in Eqs. (3-2) and (3-3). 
 
3.2.1 Calculation of PFS and Cost 
 Cost is defined as: 
∑ ∑
∈ ∈
=
Sl Ai
lil yCCost  (3-4) 
where Cl is the cost of l
th safeguard and yli is a binary indicator variable indicating 
whether or not a safeguard of type l is installed on arc i (1 if installed, 0 if not). 
 Calculation of PFS follows the following general outline: 
1. Calculate detection probability. 
2. Calculate guard response time. 
3. Calculate probability of timely detection, which is conditional on detection 
because timely detection cannot occur unless detection occurs first. 
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4. Calculate probability of adversary neutralization which is conditional on 
timely detection because neutralization cannot occur unless timely detection 
has occurred.  Thus, the adversary cannot be neutralized if he or she is not 
first caught (detected in a timely manner) and this cannot happen unless his or 
her presence in the facility is first detected. 
5. Calculate PFS as the complement of PE, which is further defined as the sum of 
the per-arc product of detection, timely detection, and neutralization40.  Thus, 
PFS for path k is defined as:  
[ ]∑
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where 
kFS
P  is the probability of security system failure for the kth path, 
kE
P  is the 
probability of system effectiveness for the kth path, n is the number of arcs on the path, 
ikD
P  is the detection probability across arc i on the kth path, 
ikk DTD
P |  is the timely detection 
probability on path k given that detection at arc i on path k (Dik) occurs, 
kk TDN
P  is the 
neutralization probability on path k given that timely detection on path k (TDk) occurs, xik 
is a binary variable indicating whether or not flow is traveling across arc i on path k.     
 The following sections discuss details of calculating the quantities in Eq. (3-5). 
3.2.1.1 Probability of Detection 
 The formulation used to calculate 
ikD
P  is based on the Estimate of Adversary 
Sequence Interruption formulation created by Bennett10 and developed in Garcia40.  The 
formula calculates the total detection probability due to the uninterdicted detection 
probability and the installed safeguards on a particular arc.  Then, the cumulative 
probability of detection of all arcs leading up to the current arc is calculated.  The current 
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total detection probability is multiplied by the cumulative probability of non-detection, or 
1-PD, for the previous arcs.  The purpose of doing this is to ensure that the total detection 
probability does not exceed 1.  The cumulative probability of detection can be thought of 
as the probability that the adversary is detected on any of the arcs.  For example, if PD = 
.5 for arc 1, and .6 for arc 2, the cumulative PD = )( 21 DDP ∪ = 0.5 + 0.6 - (0.5*0.6) = 
0.8.  This per-arc value is then normalized by the probability that the adversary has not 
been detected until the current arc.  
ikD
P  is thus defined as: 
∏∏
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(3-6) 
where 
OD
P  is the arc’s uninterdicted detection probability, 
liD
P  is the detection 
probability of the lth safeguard on the ith arc, liky  
is a binary variable indicating whether 
or not a safeguard of type l is installed on arc i of path k, 
jD
P  is the probability of 
detection across arc j, and xjk is a binary variable indicating whether or not flow travels 
across arc j on path k.  The part of Eq. (3-6) that falls within the square brackets 
corresponds to the current arc.  This value is then adjusted by the part of Eq. (3-6) to the 
right of the square brackets, the probability of non-detection on previous arcs.   
 PD values are assumed to be provided by the manufacturer of the individual 
safeguard as a performance metric for the particular item.  These values are readily 
available for use in analysis. 
3.2.1.2 Probability of Timely Detection 
 0| >
ikDk
PTDP  is calculated differently depending on whether or not the analysis is 
deterministic or stochastic.  The stochastic formulation of 
ikk DTD
P |  is discussed in Section 
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3.4.1.  Timely detection given detection at an arc includes both the current arc and future 
arcs the adversary will travel on.  For example, timely detection at arc 1 includes both the 
timely detection that occurs at arc 1 plus any potential downstream timely detection that 
may occur further in the adversary’s path.  
ikk DTD
P | , then, can be thought of as the 
complement of the non-timely detection probabilities, as follows:  
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(3-7) 
where gjk may be referred to as the limit state function for timely detection on the j
th
 arc 
on the kth path (The limit state function is formulated such that gjk < 0 indicates failure 
(for the adversary), gjk > 0 indicates success, and gjk = 0, the boundary between failure 
and success is referred to as the limit state.  θ = 1 indicates that detection occurs at the 
beginning of the task and θ = 0 indicates that detection occurs at the end of the task.), Tm 
is the travel time across arc m, 
jkG
T  is the minimum guard response time to arc j on path 
k, and θ is the location in the current task at which detection occurs.  This formulation is 
based on Bennett10 and Garcia40, and includes the assumption that guards have an arc that 
they are assigned to patrol.  For this reason, the timely detection probability is calculated 
on a per-arc basis based on detection at arc i and then aggregated, as in Eq. (3-7). 
 Throughout this methodology, the term “guard” is used in general terms to refer 
to any response personnel.  That is, a guard could mean an armed, specialized SWAT 
team or an unarmed on-site security guard.  Guards are assumed to be willing to engage 
in battle with adversaries and these assumptions will be further discussed in the following 
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section.  If desired, differing guard types can be reflected as different safeguard types 
with specific delay, detection, and neutralization capabilities. 
 In order to facilitate the analysis in Eq. (3-7) (and in the next section), the analyst 
must also develop a strategy for dispatching guards throughout the facility to respond to 
the detection of an adversary.  While the approach used is not necessarily the optimal 
dispatch of guards, it is thought that the split-second decision required of the guards to 
respond to a facility intrusion would not allow for the guards to allocate themselves 
optimally.  Guards are assigned to a particular arc.  Then, a heuristic approach is used to 
dispatch each guard to the nearest expected adversary location, which is path dependent.  
For example, if a guard is assigned to arc 4-D in the network shown in Figure 3-4, he or 
she will remain on 4-D if the adversary attacks through path O-2-4-D.  On the other hand, 
if the adversary attacks through path O-2-3-5-D, the guard must travel to the nearest arc 
on that path to attempt to neutralize the adversary.  Thus, the guard travels to arc 5-D.  
While this approach may be optimistic as it assumes that the guards can determine where 
the adversary will travel, it is a first attempt at developing a guard response strategy. 
 Consequently, guard response time, 
ikG
T , must be calculated.  
ikG
T  is calculated 
using the Floyd-Warshall all-pairs shortest path algorithm3,37,101.  The algorithm uses an 
adjacency matrix of a weighted, directed graph to determine the shortest path between the 
guard’s stationed location and the assigned arcs in the adversary’s path.  The weight of 
each arc represents the travel time across the arc (this is always Ti for the guards, as it is 
assumed they are not impeded by safeguards).  The algorithm computes 
ikG
T  for each set 
of nodes (in this case, the times between the guard’s stationed location and all other 
nodes in the facility), which is defined as the minimum travel time path between them.  
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This assumes that the guards will not travel throughout the facility to interrupt or 
neutralize an adversary.  While this is a conservative assumption, it is reasonable in order 
to make the analysis feasible.  Additionally, the presence of multiple teams implies that 
any single team could be seen as a decoy employed by the adversary.  If the guard were 
to leave his or her post to travel to any location within the facility, the post would be 
vulnerable to attack by subsequent adversaries.   
3.2.1.3 Probability of Neutralization 
 
kk TDN
P  is typically calculated using complicated simulation tools99, but it can also 
be estimated using analytical approximations15.  The approximation used in this analysis 
is based on mathematical formulas developed by Lanchester68 for calculating attrition 
rates of combating military forces.  Lanchester determined that the power of an army 
with widespread attacking capabilities (i.e. it can attack multiple targets at once) is 
proportional to the square of the number of units in the army.  This relationship is 
reflected in Lanchester’s Square Law, defined as follows for combat between guard and 
adversary forces: 
)-AE(A-GG FOFO
2222 =  (3-8) 
where GO is the initial number of individuals in the guard force, GF is the final number of 
individuals in the guard force, E is the exchange rate of weapon efficiency (relative 
weaponry/skill level between forces), AO is initial number of adversaries, and AF is the 
final number of adversaries. 
 Equation (3-8) is reformulated by Brown15, based on all potential final scenarios 
of guard and adversary forces that result in adversary forces being completely eliminated.  
This is the definition of neutralization, as the security force neutralizes the adversary 
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when the adversary force is depleted completely (or the adversary surrenders).  Brown’s 
work assumes that E in Eq. (3-8) is 1; that is, the forces are equally capable and matched 
in weaponry.  An example use of this equation is a problem in which both guard and 
adversary forces start with 2 individuals.  Assuming that simultaneous kills cannot occur 
(a limitation of Brown’s work), the end states that result in a victory for the guard team 
are the guard team with 1 individual and adversary team with 0 or the guard team with 2 
individuals and adversary team with 0.  An additional limitation of Lanchester and 
Brown’s derivation is the lack of a surrender option.  A surrender option is included in 
the methodology presented here through a weighted sum of the number of adversary 
forces versus the total number of adversary and guard forces.  If the adversary is severely 
outnumbered, he or she is likely to surrender.  If he or she feels that victory is achievable, 
he or she is more likely to engage in battle.  The inclusion of surrender assumes that the 
adversary is rational.  This is a significant assumption and can be eliminated by changing 
Psurrender to 0.  
kik TDN
P , then, is calculated as follows:  
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(3-9) 
where 
iksurrender
P  is the probability of adversary surrender on arc i of path k once he or she 
is interrupted, Gik is the number of guard force individuals on arc i of path k, Aik is the 
number of adversaries on arc i of path k, 
ikik AG
P  is the probability that Gik guards will 
neutralize Aik adversaries given in Brown’s work
15, and Il is a binary variable indicating 
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whether or not the lth safeguard type is a guard.  Brown’s summation15 (
ikik AG
P ) calculates 
the various end scenarios of battle between adversary and guard forces that result in the 
adversary being completely neutralized (i.e. 2 guards, 0 adversaries or 1 guard, 0 
adversaries for a two adversary, two guard battle). 
 Once 
kik TDN
P  is obtained for all arcs of a particular path using Eq. (3-9), these 
values must be combined in order to include the location of detection.  The reason for this 
is that complete neutralization on an arc includes both the current arc and future arcs the 
adversary may travel on.  For example, neutralization at arc 1 includes both the 
neutralization that occurs at arc 1 plus any potential downstream neutralization that may 
occur further in the adversary’s path.  
kk TDN
P , then, can be thought of as the complement 
of the non-neutralization probabilities, as follows:  
)1(1
kikkk TDN
n
ij
TDN
PP ∏
=
−−=  (3-10) 
where all variables are as before. 
 Eq. (3-10) assumes that timely detection and neutralization are calculated 
independently at every arc.  This formulation then combines the values at each arc, as in 
Eq. (3-5).  If timely detection is equal to 0, neutralization does not matter as PFS will 
equal 1.  If neutralization is equal to 0, regardless of the value of timely detection, PFS 
will equal 1.  Since neutralization is conditional on timely detection being greater than 0, 
the two values can be separated.  
 The following section discusses the utilization of previous work exploring similar 
network-based problems to solve this problem formulation. 
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3.3 Network Interdiction 
 Facility protection optimization (FPO) is a process by which a facility “network” 
is disrupted by increasing the path length or lowering the capacity across an arc in the 
facility in one form or another.  An analogous form of the FPO problem, network 
interdiction, has been studied in detail in previous literature.  Network interdiction 
performs the same actions as FPO intends to perform, except for an entire network such 
as a communications network or an interstate system.  The following sections discuss 
deterministic and stochastic network interdiction literature, respectively. 
 
3.3.1 Deterministic Network Interdiction 
 Deterministic network interdiction has been studied by McMasters and Mustin77, 
Phillips87, and Wood104, focusing on military applications, and on the interdiction of 
illegal drugs and their contributing chemicals.  The maximum flow approach to network 
interdiction is often used for problems such as drug networks, where the interdictor, 
presumably a government body, is trying to interrupt the flow of drugs through a network 
by creating choke points in the network which severely decrease the allowable material 
flow through the network. 
 The optimization of UtilityPPS (as defined in Eq. (3-2)) is analogous to the 
problem of maximizing the travel time of the shortest path, which has been addressed as a 
deterministic problem in detail in Fulkerson and Harding38, Golden46, Israeli59, and Israeli 
and Wood60.  In this study, the goal of the interdictor (facility owner) is to increase the 
UtilityPPS to as large a value as possible by interdicting arcs in the network, potentially 
increasing their travel times (with barriers) and detection probabilities (with detectors).  
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This interdiction seeks to deter the adversary from attempting to attack the facility or to 
ensure he or she is interrupted and neutralized if he or she chooses to attack.  This 
concept was discussed in more detail in Section 1.3.  
 
3.3.2 Stochastic Network Interdiction 
 It is necessary to include stochastic elements in facility protection optimization in 
order to perform a real-world analysis.  The stochastic elements considered in this study 
are the times to traverse each arc, the probabilities of successful performance of various 
safeguards, uninterdicted arc detection probabilities, guard response time, location 
(within an arc) of the adversary’s detection (θ), and the travel time increases as a result of 
the safeguards.  Safeguard costs are assumed to be deterministic (life cycle costs) in order 
to simplify the problem analysis. 
 Stochastic network interdiction is addressed in Cormican, Morton, and Wood26 
and Sanchez and Wood94 with an objective of minimizing the maximum flow through the 
network.  Pan, Charlton, and Morton81 address the objective of minimizing the 
adversary’s maximum probability of success in traversing the network.  Israeli59 explores 
the objective of maximizing the shortest path. 
 The traditional approach to solving non-deterministic network interdiction 
problems has been to use a two-stage stochastic program with recourse.  The two-stage 
stochastic programming approach, developed by Birge and Louveaux11, requires 
discretization and decomposition, numerical simulation, or enumeration in order to 
include the randomness in the problem.  In this type of problem, a first-stage decision 
(e.g. safeguard location and types) is made to optimize an objective (e.g. maximize the 
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adversary’s shortest travel time), taking into account the second stage decision (e.g. the 
adversary’s choice of paths).  All of the variables within the problem involve some level 
of uncertainty and should be addressed accordingly.  Sanchez and Wood94 use Monte 
Carlo sampling to screen and select the best critical paths (e.g. shortest paths).  The 
random element in their model is whether or not the attempted interdiction succeeds.  
Cormican, Morton, and Wood26 explore the use of both interdiction success and arc 
capacities as random parameters, assigning them a number of finite values.  Pan, 
Charlton, and Morton81 handle the adversary’s chosen origin and destination pair as an 
unknown event.  The approach used in this study is significantly different than the 
expected value approach used by Israeli59 or the typical sequential approach used by 
Cormican, Morton, and Wood26 and Sanchez and Wood94.  These two approaches use a 
sequential approximation algorithm combined with Monte Carlo simulation to create 
bounds on a solution and not an exact solution.  While this approach is valid, it requires 
significant computational effort in order to achieve accurate results.  Convergence of 
Monte Carlo to an accurate result usually requires at least several thousand iterations (for 
realistic failure probabilities of the order < 0.001) until the distribution of the random 
variables begins to emulate the actual distribution of the variables and yields meaningful 
results.   
 As mentioned in Section 3.2, the problem formulation given in Eq. (3-3) looks 
similar to the problems solved in the field of reliability-based design optimization 
(RBDO) for mechanical systems. (The probabilistic constraint in Eq. (3-3) is referred to 
as a reliability constraint in mechanical systems design).  Research in such problems over 
the past two decades has resulted in several techniques for probabilistic analysis and 
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optimization that are much more efficient than the Monte Carlo-based optimization 
methods typically used in the stochastic network interdiction literature. Therefore, this 
study combines the concepts of network interdiction with reliability-based design 
optimization and first order reliability method (FORM) techniques, to allow for a FPO 
methodology which efficiently and effectively incorporates uncertainty.  The next section 
briefly reviews reliability analysis and reliability-based optimization techniques, both of 
which are then used in subsequent sections to solve the formulation in Eq. (3-3). 
 
3.4 Uncertainty Analysis 
 Reliability-based design optimization (RBDO) is concerned with finding a set of 
design variables for a given engineering system such that a given objective function is 
optimized (e.g., minimum cost, minimum weight, etc.) and the design requirements 
(strength, durability, etc.) are satisfied with high probability.  As mentioned in Section 
3.2 and the previous section, the problem formulation for FPO in Eq. (3-3) is similar to 
reliability-based design optimization (RBDO). 
 There are two steps in solving Eq. (3-3). Step 1 is reliability analysis, i.e., 
evaluation of the probability constraint. Step 2 is optimization. Step 1 is discussed in the 
following section, focusing on a first-order approximation to calculate the probabilistic 
constraint in Eq. (3-3). Methods under step 2 are reviewed in Section 3.4.2, and the 
approach utilized in this study is discussed in detail in Chapter IV. 
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3.4.1 Reliability Analysis 
 Analytical calculation of probability of timely detection, 
ikk DTD
P | , (refer to Eq. (3-
7)) which for the remainder of this section is denoted as TDP  for notational simplicity, 
requires the evaluation of the integral of the joint probability density function (pdf) of all 
the random variables over the failure domain, as: 
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=≤=
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where gjk is as defined in Eq. (3-7).  The failure domain can be thought of as the region in 
which timely detection occurs, so timely detection in this sense is a failure event.  This 
integral poses computational hurdles as it can be difficult to formulate the joint 
probability density explicitly and integration of a multidimensional integral may be 
difficult.  Therefore, numerical integration methods such as Monte Carlo simulation or 
analytical approximations such as first-order reliability method (FORM) or second-order 
methods (such as the second-order reliability method, SORM) are commonly used in 
mechanical systems reliability analysis.  Monte Carlo simulation requires multiple runs of 
the deterministic system analysis and can be very costly. On the other hand, analytical 
approximations such as FORM and SORM are very efficient, and have been shown to 
provide reasonably accurate estimates of the probability integral for numerous 
applications in mechanical and structural systems.  Detailed descriptions of these 
methods and computational issues are provided in Ang and Tang5, Haldar and 
Mahadevan52, and Ditlevsen and Madsen31. 
 In FORM, the variables, x, which may each be of a different probability 
distribution, and may be correlated, are first translated to equivalent uncorrelated 
standard normal variables u.  For uncorrelated normal variables, this transformation is 
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simply ui = 
i
iix
σ
µ−
.  (Later, this concept is expanded to include variables that are non-
normal and/or correlated).  The limit state and the failure and safe regions are shown in 
Figure 3-6, in the equivalent uncorrelated standard normal space u.  
 
 
Figure 3-6: Illustration of limit state and failure and safe regions 
 
 The failure probability is now the integral of the joint normal pdf over the failure 
region.  The FORM replaces the nonlinear boundary g = 0 with a linear approximation, at 
the closest point to the origin, and calculates the TDP  as follows: 
TDP  = P( gjk (d,x) ≤ 0 ) = Φ (-β(d,u)) (3-12) 
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of a standard normal variable and 
β(d,u) is the minimum distance from the origin to the limit state. Thus, the 
multidimensional integral of the joint pdf is now approximated with a single dimensional 
integral as in Eq. (3-12), the argument of which (i.e., β(d,u)) is calculated from a 
u2 
u1 
g(u) = 0 
g(u) < 0 (failure) 
g(u) > 0 (safety) 
β 
u* (minimum distance point) 
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minimum distance search. The minimum distance point on the limit state is also referred 
to as the most probable point (MPP), since linear approximation at this point gives the 
highest estimate of the failure probability as opposed to linearization at any other point on 
the limit state. (A second-order approximation of the failure boundary is referred to as 
SORM14,66,98, where the failure probability calculation also requires curvatures of the 
limit state). 
 The minimum distance point (or MPP) u* is found as the solution to the problem:  
min β (d,u) 
s.t. gjk (d,x) ≤ 0 
(3-13) 
A Newton-based method to solve Eq. (3-13) was suggested by Rackwitz and Fiessler90. 
Other methods such as sequential quadratic programming70 (SQP) have also been used in 
the literature32,107. 
 The minimum distance point may also be found using a dual formulation of Eq. 
(3-13) as  
min gjk (d,x) 
s.t. || u || = βι 
(3-14) 
where all variables are as before.  This dual problem may be referred to as inverse 
FORM. 
 For non-normal variables, the transformation to uncorrelated standard normal 
space is ui = N
i
N
iix
σ
µ−
, where Nxµ  and 
N
xσ  are the equivalent normal mean and standard 
deviation, respectively, of the x variables at each iteration during the minimum distance 
search. Rackwitz and Fiessler90 suggested the solution of Nxµ  and 
N
xσ  by matching the 
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PDF and CDF of the original variable and the equivalent normal variable at the iteration 
point. Other transformations are also available73,92. 
 If the variables are correlated, then the equivalent normal variables are also 
correlated. In that case, these are transformed to an uncorrelated space through an 
orthonormal transformation of the correlation matrix of the random variables through 
eigenvector analysis or a Cholesky factorization52. The minimum distance search and 
first-order or second-order approximation to the probability integral is only carried out in 
the uncorrelated standard normal space.  Further guidance on the overall reliability 
analysis procedure is provided by Haldar and Mahadevan52. 
 The minimum distance search typically involves five to ten evaluations of the 
limit state (and thus system analysis), and then the probability is evaluated using a simple 
analytical formula as in Eq. (3-12).  Compared to this, Monte Carlo simulation may need 
thousands of samples if the failure probability is small, thus making Monte Carlo 
methods prohibitively expensive for solving large scale stochastic optimization problems. 
 FORM has been found to be very accurate for linear limit states with normal 
variables.  Although the limit state in the evaluation of TDP  is nonlinear (although it is 
close to linear) and the random variables are not normal (although they are truncated 
normal variables), FORM is found to be of sufficient accuracy in this problem.  This 
assumption is evaluated further in Sections 4.5 and 4.6 as FORM results are compared 
with Monte Carlo results to show there is no noticeable gain in accuracy to justify the 
additional computational expense of Monte Carlo simulation. 
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3.4.2 Reliability-Based Optimization 
 In many reliability-based optimization studies25,32,71,97,106,107, a probability 
constraint has been replaced by a quantile equivalent, i.e., by a minimum distance 
constraint.  In the current problem, this leads to 
t s.t.
][min
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(3-15) 
where βt = )(1 tP
−Φ− , Pt is a target probability value, and βi is the minimum distance 
computed from Eq. (3-13). Alternatively, the dual formulation has also been used, based 
on Eq. (3-14), as 
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where gi (d,x) is computed from Eq. (3-14).  
Since the reliability constraint evaluation itself is an iterative procedure (see Eqs. 
(3-13) and (3-14)), the number of function evaluations required for reliability-based 
optimization is considerably larger than deterministic or safety factor-based optimization.  
A simple nested implementation of RBDO (i.e., reliability analysis iterations nested 
within optimization iterations, as in Figure 3-7) tremendously increases the 
computational effort, and as a result, several approaches have been developed to improve 
the computational efficiency, typically measured in terms of the number of functional 
evaluations required to reach a solution for RBDO methods.  In decoupled 
methods32,93,107  the reliability analysis iterations and the optimization iterations are 
executed sequentially, instead of in a nested manner (refer to Figure 3-8, where OL 
represents optimization loop and RL represents reliability loop).  This is done by fixing 
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the results of one analysis while performing the iterations of the other analysis.  Single 
loop methods67,71,98 perform the optimization through an equivalent deterministic 
formulation which replaces the reliability analysis constraint with the equivalent Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker conditions at the minimum distance point on the limit state.  Several 
versions of decoupled and single loop methods have been developed, based on whether 
direct or inverse FORM is used for the reliability analysis step.  Note that FORM is used 
in all of these efficient RBDO techniques, although the method developed by Zou and 
Mahadevan107 does not require FORM.  Further information on the various RBDO 
formulations is provided in Chiralaksanakul and Mahadevan24.  Further discussion on the 
application of the chosen RBDO methodology is provided in Section 4.3. 
 
 
Figure 3-7: Illustration of Nested RBDO Method 
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Figure 3-8: Illustration of Decoupled RBDO with Inverse FORM 
 
3.5 Summary   
 This chapter presented the general problem framework of the facility protection 
optimization problem, utilizing a network representation.  A complete problem statement 
was introduced utilizing the metric of UtilityPPS, which combines Cost and PFS.  Given 
computationally intensive methods used in previous literature, an efficient method that 
combines RBDO with FORM was introduced to handle uncertainty and solve the 
problem statement efficiently.  Chapter IV provides a complete solution methodology for 
the general problem framework presented in this chapter for solving single adversary 
team problems. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
SINGLE ADVERSARY TEAM METHODOLOGY 
 
 This chapter pursues the second objective of this study, i.e. to develop an 
approach to solve the problem formulated in Chapter III in order to handle a single 
adversary team attack.  The following simplifications and assumptions have been made in 
developing the solution approach:  
• The adversary is assumed to be attacking the facility as a single entity.  An extension 
of this approach to address multiple teams is provided in Chapter V. 
• The adversary is assumed to be an outsider.  Refer to Section 2.1.2.1 for an overview 
of outsider characteristics. 
• All random variables are assumed to be uncorrelated, rather than assuming values of 
correlation for the problem analysis, which would be more controversial than 
eliminating correlation entirely.  Correlation can be incorporated without a great deal 
of additional work. 
• Response force actions are simplified by assuming the guards are assigned to a 
particular patrol area, as discussed in Section 3.2.1.3.  Recall that guards are stationed 
on a given arc and they are allowed to respond to nearby arcs when the adversary’s 
strategy necessitates this. 
• The calculation of PE is through a first-order approximation, as in Section 3.4.1. 
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• The connectivity diagrams for the example problems are location-based, as discussed 
in Section 3.1.  The diagrams represent the physical layout of the facility.   
• Cost is assumed to be deterministic and linear.  That is, one value is used for the cost 
of each safeguard (assumed to be life cycle cost) and this cost per safeguard does not 
change regardless of how many of a particular safeguard are purchased.  That is to 
say, there are no discounts for safeguard bundles. 
• It is assumed throughout this methodology that only one of each safeguard type can 
be installed on each arc.  This constraint is enforced by restricting variables to binary 
variables, and it can be removed and the values can be restricted to higher integer (or 
non-integer) values if necessary. 
• It is assumed that sabotage requires access to the actual target.  This assumption will 
result in a different security system than if the adversary was able to sabotage the 
target from a distance.  This surrounding area control may be explored in future work. 
 Section 4.1 discusses the identification of set of critical paths for inclusion into 
the optimization, while Section 4.2 addresses safeguards optimization.  Section 4.3 then 
discusses the chosen optimization strategy.  Section 4.4 follows with a discussion of 
method efficiency.  Sections 4.5 and 4.6 apply the developed methodology to explore 
new facility design, upgrades analysis, and existing facility analysis for two example 
problems.  Section 4.7 demonstrates the methodology on a simple practical example.  The 
chapter concludes in Section 4.8 with some remarks about the methods. 
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4.1 Determine Critical Path Set 
 Identification of the critical path set is necessary in order to determine which 
paths in the facility are the most vulnerable (and subsequently defend these paths with 
optimal safeguards placement), as discussed in Section 1.3 and Chapter II.  The critical 
path set is determined directly from the connectivity diagram and the parameters 
identified in Section 3.1 and it is based on the concept of determining which paths in the 
facility are the most vulnerable.   
 One approach to determining the critical path set is to simply enumerate feasible 
paths through the facility.  This approach ignores the objective being considered and 
merely attempts to find paths which satisfy the arc-node incidence matrix and node 
balance constraints (as discussed in Section 3.1.4).  This approach involves solving a 
linear system of equations and therefore, is computationally very efficient.  The 
drawback, however, is that this approach often enumerates more paths than are necessary 
for inclusion into the safeguards analysis.  As a result, it can be computationally 
inefficient for larger problems. 
 Alternatively, optimal path selection can be utilized to determine the critical path 
set.  First, the path with the optimal value of PE is calculated (in terms of the adversary’s 
viewpoint, since the adversary is only concerned with defeating the PPS, his or her goal 
is based entirely on the path with the lowest PE). 
 If the analysis is intended to evaluate the current PPS, the optimal path selection 
stops with the adversary’s optimal path identification as the facility owner is only 
concerned about the worst case adversary path (as this is the likely path of attack, based 
on the discussion in Section 1.3).  If however, an upgrades analysis or new system design 
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is being performed, the next k best unique paths without repeated arcs through the facility 
are calculated.  More information on k-shortest paths problem formulations is provided in 
a survey by Eppstein33.  Uniqueness in this case means that any path cannot contain all 
the arcs of a previously identified path.  The path identification continues until the PE of 
the kth best unique path is above some predefined threshold or until the budget for 
safeguards is exhausted (in the case of an upgrades analysis).  This set of paths is referred 
to as the critical path set (CPS) and it is used during the safeguards analysis.  In the 
absence of constraints (as in feasible path selection), the CPS would be equivalent to the 
set of all unique paths without repeated arcs in the facility.  Details of this process are 
shown in Section 4.1.2, where a formal definition of CPS is provided. 
 The importance of analyzing all paths below a threshold value is to ensure that the 
interdictor does not leave a vulnerable path, that is, an uninterdicted route through the 
network which the adversary can exploit to his advantage.  The reason for including only 
unique paths is that any additional path would be redundant and represent objective levels 
above those of the critical paths.  For instance, the critical paths for the simple location-
based undirected CD shown in Figure 4-1 (traveling from A-F, where values shown are 
travel times) are ABCEF and ABDEF.  Any additional paths would be unnecessary.  Path 
ABCEDBCEF is a valid path to travel from A to F, but it is not a unique path in that it 
contains all the arcs found in the path ABCEF.  Since the longer path contains all arcs 
which are present in ABCEF, any safeguards applied to the shorter path in turn affects 
any longer paths as well, and it is therefore unnecessary to include this non-unique path 
in the analysis.  Additionally, ABCEDBCEF contains the repeated arcs of BC and CE.  
For these reasons, path ABCEDBCEF is not included in the safeguards optimization. 
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Figure 4-1: Located-Based Connectivity Diagram #2 
 
 As both the feasible path selection and optimal path selection approaches to 
critical path enumeration are new, previous critical selection work is addressed in the 
following section. 
 
4.1.1 Previous Critical Path Selection Research 
 Several approaches are available in the literature for solving network interdiction 
problems but they are either computationally expensive or result in redundant paths 
which are unnecessary for inclusion in the analysis.  Sanchez and Wood94 develop an 
algorithm called BEST which enumerates all critical paths with an objective value that 
falls within predefined bounds.  This could result in redundant paths which are 
unnecessary for inclusion into the analysis in all but a completely directed network.  
Cormican, Morton, and Wood26 enumerate all critical paths, further increasing the 
computational effort of the approach that Sanchez and Wood employ.  Enumerating only 
the unique paths without repeated arcs (subject to budget and performance constraints) 
would save computational effort since the unnecessary paths are not included in the 
safeguards optimization. 
 Since previous techniques tend to enumerate a larger number of paths, these 
methodologies tend to focus effort on efficiently performing the interdiction analysis 
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through decomposition techniques (Israeli59; Israeli and Wood60), whereas the focus in 
the methodology proposed in this study is on restricting the number of paths analyzed and 
decoupling the critical path enumeration from the safeguards optimization.  As the 
safeguards optimization is a costly integer mathematical program, reformulating the 
problem so that it only needs to be solved once saves significantly on computational 
effort.  Further discussion of the computational efficiency of this approach is provided in 
Section 4.4. 
 The approach followed in this methodology is to utilize feasible path analysis for 
simple problems and to use optimal path analysis for more complicated problems.  If the 
network is simple, as in Figure 4-1, feasible path analysis can be undertaken to save 
computational effort.  If the network is more complicated, as is often the case with real 
world problems, then computer-based optimization techniques must be used to determine 
the CPS.  A detailed mathematical formulation of critical path selection follows. 
 
4.1.2 Mathematical Formulation of Critical Path Selection 
 If the analysis of the network does not require optimal path selection (i.e. if the 
problem is not large scale), then feasible path selection is advised. Feasible path selection 
is of the form: 
Xxik ∈ Find  (4-1) 
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where xik is a binary variable indicating whether or not flow is traveling across arc i on 
path k, X is the set of all feasible xik’s, i is an index representing arcs in the path, and 
Cardk is the cardinality of the set of arcs in the k
th critical path. 
 The first constraint in Eq. (4-1) represents standard flow balance constraints for 
network problems.  They ensure that any flow (in this case, the adversary’s path) that 
enters the network must exit it and the flow balance at all intermediate nodes (non-origins 
and destinations) is zero. 
 The second constraint in Eq. (4-1) ensures path uniqueness by forcing the sum of 
the xik’s to be less than the cardinality for the paths of the previous iterations.  For 
example, the shortest path for the network in Figure 4-1 (if the values shown are delay 
times) is ABCEF.  To find the 2nd shortest unique path, a constraint is added which says: 
xAB,1 + xBC,1 + xCE,1 + xEF,1 < 4.  This formulation finds the shortest path through the 
network that does not include the path of AB-BC-CE-EF. 
 The final constraint in Eq. (4-1) ensures that paths with repeated arcs are 
prevented.  This constraint restricts flow values to either 0 (no flow) or 1 (single flow).  
In order for travel across a particular arc to be repeated, the flow would have to be 
allowed to be an integer value above one. 
 The overall algorithm to find the critical path set (CPS) using feasible path 
selection, then, is as follows: 
 Step 0: Initialize CPS = 0. 
 Step 1: Solve for set of feasible xik’s using Eq. (4-1).  Add solution to critical 
 path set. 
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 Step 2: Repeat Step 1 until infeasible (no feasible paths remain). 
 If, however, optimal path selection is necessary, then the procedure for 
identifying the CPS is more involved.  In this step, the analyst is looking for the most 
vulnerable set of paths, defined in this case as those with the lowest PE.  This begins by 
evaluating the minimum PE path through the network and continues to find the next k 
best unique paths through the facility.  If either an upgrades analysis or new system 
design is being undertaken, a complete CPS must be calculated through the following 
formulation:  
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where 
limitE
P  is the minimum acceptable PE for the paths, MCSk is the minimum cut set of 
safeguards for all the enumerated paths (that is, the minimum number of safeguards 
required to interdict each path in the CPS at least once), and all else is as before.  Details 
of calculating 
kE
P  are provided in Section 3.2.1. 
 The first, second, and third constraints are identical to those in Eq. (4-1). 
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 The fourth and fifth constraints in Eq. (4-2) represent performance and budget 
constraints, respectively.  They determine a stopping point for the CPS enumeration 
based on performance limits and the available budget.  If the analyst has a performance 
limit above which he or she feels path enumeration is no longer necessary, the fourth 
constraint terminates the CPS enumeration.  If the analyst has a budget for additional 
safeguard expenditures ($0 in the case of an existing facility analysis, an analyst-defined 
amount if an upgrades analysis is being undertaken, or total cost of complete safeguards 
enumeration if a complete new system design is being undertaken), the fifth constraint 
allows for enumeration of paths until each path cannot be interdicted with at least one 
safeguard.  In other words, if the paths all share one common arc, then the minimum cut 
set is one and therefore interdiction only requires a budget of one safeguard.  If, however, 
there are no shared arcs among two paths, then the minimum cut set is two and the budget 
must allow for installation of two safeguards or the CPS enumeration will terminate. 
 The deterministic problem formulation of Eq. (4-2) can be modified to a 
stochastic formulation as:  
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as described in Section 3.4.1, and all other variables are as before.  Eq. (4-1) can be 
reformulated in a manner similar to Eq. (4-3) if desired.  
 The major difference between the formulations of Eqs. (4-2) and (4-3) lies in the 
evaluation of the objective.  In Eq. (4-2), all values in the equation are considered 
deterministic. 
 The overall algorithm to find the critical path set (CPS) using optimal path 
selection, then, is as follows:  
 Step 0: Initialize CPS = 0. 
 Step 1: Solve for set of xik’s using Eq. (4-3).  Add solution to critical path set. 
Step 2: Repeat Step 1 until either the 4th or 5th constraint are violated or no 
feasible paths remain. 
 Once the critical path set is generated (through either feasible path selection or 
optimal path selection), it is retained for further analysis in the safeguards optimization 
step, detailed in the next section. 
 
4.2 Design Optimization of the Safeguards System 
 The purpose of this section is to develop a mathematical model for optimum 
design of the safeguards system.  A multiobjective optimization approach is required to 
perform this optimization, as discussed in the following section. The safeguards 
optimization formulation is then discussed. 
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4.2.1 Multiobjective Optimization 
 While UtilityPPS (refer to Eq. (3-1)) is a single objective, it contains both Cost and 
PFS objectives which must be optimized simultaneously.  Since neither Cost nor PFS can 
be expressed explicitly in terms of one another (i.e. Cost ≠ f(PFS)), optimization of 
UtilityPPS requires a multiobjective approach. 
 The relative importance of both objectives is not known with certainty, otherwise 
the conflicting objectives can easily be combined into a single objective using a weighted 
sum.  The set of variables that produces the optimal outcome for this type of problem is 
referred to as the Pareto optimal set19,20,28,83 and it yields a set of possible answers for the 
multiobjective optimization.  A set of points is said to be Pareto optimal if, in moving 
from point A to another point B in the set, any improvement in one of the objective 
functions causes the value of at least one of the other objective functions to worsen.  This 
concept is shown graphically in Figure 4-2.  This is, of course, for a function in which 
both f1 and f2 are being minimized.  Theoretically, the Pareto optimal set yields an infinite 
set of solutions that the analyst can chose from.  This set reduces to a finite number of 
points in the event one of the variables can be discretized. 
 In order to choose from the solutions located on the Pareto optimal curve, an 
objective must be developed which combines minimization of cost and maximization of 
PE into one objective so that the optimal solution can be chosen. 
 The maximum value of UtilityPPS represents the best balance of cost and 
performance possible in the system.  Many approaches are available to generate the set of 
Cost and PFS values which populate the Pareto optimal set.  The most popular are 
weighted sum20, goal programming21,57, and ε-constraint20.  Although the remainder of 
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this section focuses on the bi-objective problem considered in this study, these techniques 
may be generalized to problems where more than two objectives are being optimized. 
 
 
Figure 4-2: Graphical Illustration of the Pareto Optimal Curve
20 
 
 In the weighted sum approach20 a function with two objectives is combined into a 
single objective by constructing a weighted sum of all the objectives.  The problem can 
then be optimized using standard optimization techniques.  The difficulty arises in 
assigning weights to the different objective functions.  If the combined problem is 
convex, then a complete set of non-inferior (Pareto) solutions can be found.  However, if 
the problem is not convex, generation of the entire Pareto set is not guaranteed. 
 In the second method, goal programming21,57, the analyst must construct a set of 
goals (realistic or not) that should be attained (if possible) and include all the goals in the 
objective function through a penalty function.  Although this method is simple and easy 
C 
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to use, the possibility of solutions that are not Pareto efficient and the subjectivity in the 
penalty formulation have been cited as potential weaknesses42. 
 The ε-constraint method20 does not have a problem with convexity.  In this 
formulation, all but one of the objectives are transformed into constraints and the problem 
is optimized for the remaining objective as follows: 
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where fi (x) is the i
th objective function, εi is the limit on the ith constraint. 
 For a bi-objective problem, this procedure is straightforward as εi is set to the 
minimum feasible value for fi, the problem is solved, and then εi is incrementally 
increased until it is set to the maximum feasible value for fi.  Theoretically, this method 
allows the designer to determine the complete Pareto set of optimal points, but only if all 
possible values of εi are used.  In order to ensure this, the problem can be solved with PE 
as the objective to minimize and the value of Cost in the constraint.  Since Cost can only 
take on a finite number of discrete values and safeguards decisions are deterministic and 
binary (i.e. a safeguard cannot be partially installed), the complete Pareto set is generated. 
 In order for a true representation of the decision-maker’s preferences to be taken 
into account, the decision-maker must create a complete table of his or her preferences 
and satisfaction levels for a range of possible objective value combinations.  A multi-
objective optimization technique must then be able to find a solution which satisfies these 
preferences.  It is assumed for this study that the facility owner is indifferent towards 
Cost and PE.  That is, the facility owner simply wants the best safeguards plan which 
balances these two objectives optimally.  Given this preference, as well as the simplicity 
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of implementing it since Cost is a discrete variable, multiobjective optimization is 
performed using ε-constraint optimization in this study.  The optimization is repeated 
multiple times with optimization of PE as the objective and Cost as a constraint until all 
feasible values of Cost are explored. 
 If the computational burden required to develop the entire Pareto set is 
prohibitive, a novel approach can be taken that reduces this burden.  In this limit-
constrained multiobjective optimization, the analyst must calculate the end points of the 
Pareto set, as illustrated by A and B in Figure 4-2 and discussed earlier in this section.  
These points will provide the )(minand),(max),(min),(max
nFS
N
nFS
N
n
N
n
N
PPCostCost  
necessary for evaluating Eq. (3-1).  The problem can then be solved as a unconstrained 
maximization, with Eq. (3-1) as the objective.  This formulation will provide only the 
maximum UtilityPPS point and not the entire Pareto set. 
 The following section discusses incorporating this multiobjective optimization 
framework into a deterministic and then a stochastic safeguards optimization. 
 
4.2.2 Optimization Formulation 
 The baseline safeguards optimization problem is deterministic.  All variables are 
assumed static and the problem, therefore, is significantly simpler than its stochastic 
equivalent.  The safeguards optimization is undertaken as a repeated optimization of PE 
with increasing cost constraint limits in order to facilitate multiobjective optimization (as 
outlined in the previous section). The formulation for this problem is very similar to the 
formulation for optimal path selection (Eq. (4-2)), as follows: 
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Eqs. (3-6), (3-7), and (3-10) respectively and the yik’s present in Eqs. (3-6), (3-7), and (3-
10) are the design variables. 
 The overall algorithm to find the Pareto optimal set, then, is as follows:  
 Step 0: Initialize budget to minimum budget value (0 for new system design, 
current PPS cost for upgrades analysis or existing system analysis). 
 Step 1: Solve for set of yik’s using Eq. (4-5). 
 Step 2: Compute UtilityPPS and store solution, along with set of yik’s. 
 Step 3: Increase budget by 1 unit (corresponding to cost of smallest safeguard). 
 Step 4: Repeat Steps 1-3 until budget is equal to maximum budget. 
 The set of yik’s which yields the highest value of UtilityPPS is the optimal 
safeguards configuration.  This value should be recommended to facility management as 
the chosen solution for a PPS configuration.  This formulation is limited, however, in that 
it does not include uncertainty. 
 The deterministic problem formulation of Eq. (4-5) can be modified to a 
stochastic formulation as: 
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where
ikD
P , 
ikk DTD
P | , and 
kk TDN
P  are as defined in Eqs. (3-6), (3-12), and (3-10) 
respectively. 
 The following section discusses the optimization strategies used to solve both the 
critical path selection and safeguards optimization problems. 
 
4.3 Optimization Strategy 
 Since both the critical path selection and safeguards optimization problems are 
composed of discrete decision variables, branch and bound16,69, cutting plane 
methods49,50,51 and problem reformulations, heuristics45,47,64,75, and dynamic 
programming8,62 were explored as solution algorithms early on in the analysis procedure.  
These four methods are very useful in solving complicated nonlinear optimization 
problems, as in these problems.  Following is a description of each method. 
 Given that the optimization problems involved discrete decision variables, branch 
and bound is a natural choice for optimization.  Branch and bound is a general partial 
enumeration technique which splits the main optimization problem up into smaller 
solvable subproblems, retaining the best found objective and eliminating the need to 
explore all possibilities.  In the subproblems, constraints restricting the variables to 
discrete are removed and the problem is solved as a continuous optimization problem.  
This optimization is repeated while tightening bounds on the variables by constraining 
individual variable values to integers.  Eventually, the branch and bound procedure yields 
an optimal integer solution, without requiring complete solution enumeration, which, for 
large real-world problems, is impractical.  More information on branch and bound is 
provided in Brusco and Stahl16  and Lawler and Wood69.  
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 Cutting plane methods49,50,51 and problem reformulations work by adding 
constraints to linear programs until the optimal basic solution takes on integer values.    
These methods involve reformulations of the original problem in order to make the 
overall problem solve more efficiently, as well as enhancements such as Benders’ 
decomposition9, which efficiently solves complicated problems by decomposing the 
problem into smaller subproblems and utilizing cuts to shrink the feasible solution space.  
Cutting plane methods and problem reformulations are prominent in previous network 
interdiction work26,60,81,94,104.  However, due to the implicit nature of the objective 
function utilized in this study, these methods proved unsuccessful. 
 Heuristic approaches (genetic algorithms, tabu search, and simulated annealing) 
were explored for optimization due to their potential for solving complicated 
optimization problems.  Genetic algorithms (GA) work by emulating natural selection 
and evolution to find the optimum solution of an optimization problem.  They begin with 
a random population and evolve over generations into a better solution, based on the 
fitness of current solutions.  More information on GA’s is provided by Man, Tang, and 
Kwong75 and Goldberg47.  A GA was tested for solving this problem.  Given that the GA 
returned inconsistent results with inferior objective values than the branch and bound 
solver (and in some cases, could not converge to a solution), their results are not reported.  
Mention of them is provided solely to demonstrate what approaches were used to solve 
this problem.  Tabu search45 (which operates by forbidding or penalizing moves that take 
the solution to points in the solution space already visited) and simulated annealing64  
(where the objective function is interpreted as the internal energy of a system whose state 
search space is compared to a physical system; the problem objective is minimization of 
 70 
internal energy) are two other well-known heuristic methods for obtaining the global 
optimum of a complicated objective function.  Heuristic methods do not guarantee global 
optimality and they can be difficult to implement when variables are discrete.  As a 
result, tabu search and simulated annealing were not explored further. 
 Dynamic programming8 was explored given its usefulness for solving repeated 
problems (as is the case with the safeguards analysis) through its approach of partial 
enumeration.  The basic idea of dynamic programming can be illustrated by exploring the 
knapsack optimization problem62.  In the knapsack problem, an individual wants to 
maximize the amount of N items that can fit in a knapsack with a total weight of M.  In 
order to solve this problem via dynamic programming, the problem is solved for all 
possible weights up to M.  This can be done rather quickly by using prior solutions to 
build up to larger solutions.  For example, in order to evaluate the solution for a weight of 
2, the program needs to look at solutions which build up from a weight of one or zero.  In 
order to get from zero to two, only an item with weight of two can be used.  In order to 
get from one to two, the program uses the solution for a weight of one and then adds an 
item with a weight of one.  As the program continues, this approach becomes more 
efficient as fewer inferior solutions are explored. 
 After exploring the different methods for solving the optimization problems, two 
differing techniques were chosen for the critical path generation and safeguards 
optimization.  For critical path generation, branch and bound was chosen to calculate the 
individual critical paths, due to its effectiveness in solving integer optimization problems.  
Dynamic programming was chosen for the safeguards optimization as it involves a 
repeated optimization process where cost increases incrementally. 
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 The subproblem optimizations within branch and bound were performed in 
Matlab29,76 using a combination of routines from the Matlab Optimization toolbox, 
publicly available code18,65,96, and author-developed content.  The underlying nonlinear 
optimization routine in Matlab is a sequential quadratic programming (SQP) algorithm70, 
which is designed to achieve quick, reliable results for nonlinear problems.  At each 
major iteration, the SQP method chooses an updated search direction by solving a 
quadratic programming (QP) subproblem.  An estimate of the Hessian of the Lagrangian 
is updated at each iteration using the Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno formula36,48.   A 
line search is performed to determine the new search direction using a merit function 
similar to those proposed by Han53 and Powell88,89.  The QP subproblem is solved using 
an active set strategy similar to that described in Gill, Murray, and Wright43.  Further 
information on the algorithm is provided in the Matlab user’s manual76. 
 For the purpose of both the critical path set enumeration and the safeguards 
optimization in this study, a nested method of RBDO was implemented.  Since the limit 
state function in this problem is not linear (although it is close) and involves non-normal 
variables, a FOSM approach cannot be utilized for reliability analysis.  The limit state is 
nearly linear, however, so FORM can be utilized, thereby resulting in a computationally 
inexpensive reliability loop of the RBDO process.  Therefore, the nested method is 
sufficient and single loop or decoupled approaches are not necessary.  If the problem size 
or the computational expense of the reliability analysis prevents large scale problems 
from being solved, it would be advisable to implement a single loop or decoupled 
approach to the problem.  
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 The next section provides a detailed discussion on the efficiency of the chosen 
methodology for critical path selection and safeguards optimization.   
 
4.4 Methodology Efficiency 
 Instead of concentrating effort on decomposing the problem as in previous 
network interdiction studies26,60,81,94,104, this methodology decouples the critical path 
selection and safeguards optimization completely so that the safeguards optimization only 
needs to be performed once for each cost level.  Additionally, decoupling is used in the 
safeguards optimization to separate the reliability analysis from the optimization 
procedure.  Finally, computational savings are realized through enumeration of a reduced 
critical path set. 
 For identifying the k-shortest paths in a network, the best known bound for the 
number of function evaluations required for a directed graph with m vertices and n arcs is 
O(n + m log m + k)33.  When multiple adversary teams are considered, this number is 
multiplied by the number of teams, as the size of the network grows linearly as the 
number of teams increases.  If the method described in this dissertation is utilized, the 
number of paths enumerated, k, will be less, as discussed in Section 4.1.1.  Therefore, the 
critical path selection process will require less function evaluations that previously 
identified methods.  The extent of this computational savings will depend on the network 
being analyzed. 
 The safeguards optimization requires significant computational effort.  For total 
safeguards enumeration, there are 2n*S potential safeguards plans (n*S represents the total 
number of arcs, n, multiplied by the total number of safeguards types, S) as each 
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combination of arc and safeguard type is a binary decision variable indicating whether or 
not a safeguard of a particular type is installed on a particular arc.  Each of these plans 
must be calculated for each budget level, critical path, and adversary team (C*k*R times, 
where R is the number of teams, k the number of critical paths, and C, the number of cost 
levels).  Assuming total solution enumeration, the total worst case number of functions 
required for the complete safeguards optimization, then, is C*k*R*2n*S.  Using dynamic 
programming, there are significant computational savings, as the number of function 
evaluations for the methodology in this study reduces to 
2
2nCkRS
 since the analysis now 
must be undertaken an average of 
2
kRSC
 times at each arc, of which there are n*S arcs.  
If analysis is performed using the approach in previous methodologies, this complexity 
increases to 
2
22 nCRSk
, as the safeguards optimization must be repeated each time a new 
critical path is generated (k times). 
 As a result, this methodology results in a reduction of computational effort for 
both critical path selection and safeguards analysis.  Additional savings can be seen if the 
critical paths are generated via feasible path enumeration, as detailed in Section 4.1.2. 
 Computational savings are also realized by utilizing reliability-based design 
optimization with a first-order reliability approach to analyzing uncertainty.  This dual 
layer of decoupling (decoupling of the critical path selection and safeguards optimization; 
and decoupling of the reliability analysis and safeguards optimization), plus the use of 
FORM instead of Monte Carlo simulation, results in significant computational savings 
that allow large scale problems to be solved. 
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 Following are twelve example problems.  The first six represent two separate 
network topologies, each being analyzed as a current facility analysis, an upgrades 
analysis, and a new facility PPS design.  The final six are a demonstration of the use of 
this methodology on a simple practical example.  Following each set of example 
problems is a table summarizing the CPU times of each method.  
 
4.5 Example Problem 1 
 The examples presented in this section are based on the simple network shown in 
Figure 4-3.  In this network, the origin is marked with an “O”, the destination with a “D” 
and all other intermediate nodes are numbered in no particular order.  All arcs have 
arrows to indicate the direction of flow across them since this is a directed graph.  The 
example is simple in order to demonstrate the capabilities of the developed methodology. 
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Figure 4-3: Network Graph, Example Problem 1 
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 The input variables for the network are summarized below (quantities are 
identical for all arcs): 
 
Table 4-1: Variable Statistics, Example Problem 1 
Variable Description Statistics 
Baseline guard response (TG) N(5,1) min. 
Uninterdicted travel time (T) N(1,0.1) min. 
Uninterdicted detection probability (PD) 0 
Detection location (θ) within arc N(0.5, 0.05) 
  
 
 
 There are three types of safeguards at the facility owner’s disposal: a barrier, a 
detector, and a guard.  Their properties are summarized below: 
 
Table 4-2: Safeguard Properties, Example Problem 1 
No. 
Safeguard 
Description 
Delay Time 
Statistics (mins) 
Detection Probability 
Statistics 
Cost ($K) 
1 Barrier N(1,0.1) - 5 
2 Detector - N(0.2,0.02) 10 
3 Guard N(5,1) N(0.5,0.05) 100 
 
 
 
 The stochastic optimization is carried out using both FORM and Monte Carlo 
analysis. 
 For Monte Carlo analyses, the analyses began by using 1,000 samples whenever 
PFS was required, unless otherwise noted.  Since Monte Carlo simulation (MCS) is 
computationally intensive, the intent of keeping the number of samples low is to decrease 
the resulting computational burden.  The problem with this approach, however, is that it 
does not provide consistent results for complicated problems (i.e. new system design) 
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when performing dynamic programming.  The reason for this is simple.  If the number of 
samples is small, there is a large likelihood that the MCS approach will retain an inferior 
security system at a low cost value in the analysis (as the inherent variability in MCS 
means that running the optimization several times yields slightly different results and 
therefore, differing safeguards plans at lower costs).  As a result, more samples are 
required for solution stability, further increasing the computational requirements of MCS.  
This inconsistency is eliminated by using a FORM-based approach, since it is an 
analytical approximation rather than a numerical simulation and it therefore yields 
identical results every time an optimization is performed.  This computational issue 
becomes magnified as the problem increases in complexity.  As a result, MCS-based 
optimization is considered impractical for all but the simplest of problems due to large 
computational requirements. 
 
4.5.1 Existing Facility Analysis 
 An existing facility analysis is useful if a facility owner is trying to decide 
whether or not his or her facility’s current security system provides adequate protection 
against an adversary threat. 
 For this example, a random safeguards plan was generated for the network shown 
in Figure 4-3.  The network corresponding to this random safeguards plan is shown in 
Figure 4-4. 
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Figure 4-4: Randomly Generated Network, Example Problem 1 
 
 The only results that are generated from an existing facility analysis are the Cost, 
$355K, and PFS, .2385, which were identical for both the FORM and Monte Carlo (with 
1,000 samples) analyses. 
 
4.5.2 Upgrades Analysis 
 An upgrades analysis is useful in the case that the facility owner performs an 
existing facility analysis and decides that the level of facility protection provided by the 
current security system is inadequate.  In this case, the facility owner specifies an 
allowable budget for upgrades and an upgrades analysis is performed to find out what 
level of performance improvement can be achieved with a limited budget.  
 For this example, a safeguards configuration is randomly generated (for 
illustration purposes) as shown in Figure 4-5.  This random safeguards configuration can 
be taken as the baseline scenario, with an upgrades budget of $250K.  All other data are 
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as before.  Figure 4-6 shows the results of the upgrades analysis for both FORM and 
1,000 samples of Monte Carlo (their results are identical). 
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Figure 4-5: Baseline for Upgrades Analysis, Example Problem 1 
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Figure 4-6: Upgraded Network, Example Problem 1 
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 Figure 4-7 shows the PFS vs. Cost graph for the upgraded network of Example 
Problem 1.  Figure 4-8 shows the UtilityPPS vs. Cost graph for the upgraded network of 
Example Problem 1.  It is interesting to note that the highest UtilityPPS point (as defined 
in Eq. (3-1)) does not occur when the safeguards budget is fully utilized.  This would be 
an important point to convey to a facility owner, that is, the owner does not necessarily 
have to spend all of his or her budget to achieve optimal performance in terms of 
UtilityPPS. 
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Figure 4-7: Upgraded PFS Vs. Cost, Example Problem 1 
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Figure 4-8: Upgraded UtilityPPS Vs. Cost, Example Problem 1 
 
 
 
4.5.3 New System Design 
 New system design is useful if the facility owner is creating a security system for 
a facility that has no security system installed.  This could either be because the facility is 
new and thus has not been constructed or the facility could exist but not yet have a 
security system installed. 
 Figure 4-9 shows the PPS configuration with the highest value of UtilityPPS for the 
network shown in Figure 4-3 when undertaking a new PPS system design.  Intuitively, 
these results make sense.  Having a guard response force stationed near the origin of the 
facility helps to provide ample time for the response force to neutralize the adversary.  
Additionally, the detectors placed on O-2, 2-3, 3-5 and 5-D alert the response force that 
are stationed on 4-D so that they can respond to incidents on both paths.  Finally, a 
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barrier placed on 5-D slows down the adversary to allow for ample time for the response 
force (who are not stationed on that path) to interrupt and neutralize.   
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Figure 4-9: Optimal Safeguards Results, Example Problem 1 
 
 Figure 4-10 shows the response time for the guard stationed on O-2.  Since both 
critical paths have O-2 as an arc, the guard stationed at O-2 always responds to O-2.  
Figure 4-11 shows the response time for the guard stationed on 4-D.  When the adversary 
travels on O-2-4-D, the guard remains at 4-D.  When the adversary travels along O-2-3-5-
D, however, the guard is dispatched to 5-D. 
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Figure 4-10: Guard Response Times for Guard Stationed on O-2 
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Figure 4-11: Guard Response Times for Guard Stationed on 4-D 
 
 Figure 4-12 shows the PFS plotted versus Cost for the FORM and Monte Carlo 
results (they are identical).  Running this experiment via MCS with 1,000 samples 
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yielded varying results, but the results shown in Figure 4-12 are from a 5,000 sample 
experiment, where the results proved to be stable and identical to the FORM results. 
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Figure 4-12: PFS Vs. Cost, Example Problem 1 
 
 It is obvious that the facility owner can achieve a lower PFS at a higher cost than 
the highest UtilityPPS value, but this point represents the safeguards plan that best 
balances Cost and PFS.  In other words, at a cost above $245K (PFS = 0.25402), a lower 
PFS can be achieved with additional safeguards, but the return on investment for the 
facility owner begins to diminish.  So, the facility owner can invest in additional 
safeguards (at a cost above the highest UtilityPPS configuration) in order to reduce the 
overall PFS for the facility. 
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 An additional observation that can be made about the results is how the off-site 
guards do not provide any protection in defending the facility.  Although this is a simple 
example, the guards do not arrive on site in a timely manner and therefore, PFS is equal to 
1 until a cost of $100K, when the first on-site guard is placed in the facility.  This is an 
important conclusion as it shows that off-site guards (given the problem’s assumption of 
off-site guard response time) are not effective in defending facilities against an adversary 
threat. 
 While the highest UtilityPPS scenario is calculated for an unconstrained problem 
(no constraints on Cost or PFS), the problem can also be reformulated if constraints are 
enforced.  For example, if the facility owner would not allow a PFS value of above 0.1, 
then the highest UtilityPPS value scenario can be recalculated using a truncated version of 
Figure 4-12.  Figure 4-13 shows PFS plotted versus Cost for a constrained scenario in 
which PFS is constrained to be less than or equal to 0.1.  A similar approach can be taken 
if cost constraints exist.  Additionally, these constraints can be enforced at the outset of 
the problem, thereby reducing the solution space of the problem and reducing overall 
computational effort. 
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Figure 4-13: PFS Vs. Cost with PFS Constraint, Example Problem 1 
 It is also interesting to note, that, even if all safeguards are installed, PFS does not 
reduce to 0.  This is due to the fact that neutralization approaches 1 very slowly, i.e., it 
requires large numbers of guards to achieve a PN close to 1.  A solution to this would be 
to redesign the security system with the possibility of two guards being stationed on each 
arc.  Figure 4-14 shows the safeguards configuration corresponding to the highest value 
of UtilityPPS for the case in which two guards can be placed on any arc (with safeguard 
type 4 being the potential 2nd guard per arc).  Figure 4-15 shows the Cost vs. PFS curve 
for this problem.  The revised scenario results in better performance at a lower cost.  This 
is because the network topology is such that two guards can be stationed on the first arc 
in the facility and increase the PN against both paths.  From an operator’s perspective, this 
configuration is superior but it is important to note that physical space constraints (as well 
as cost concerns) prevent the operator from having an unlimited supply of guards on each 
arc.  The remainder of the results presented in Chapters IV and V show analysis allowing 
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for the possibility of only one guard team stationed on each arc, unless otherwise noted, 
with the understanding that all analyses can be extended if desired. 
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Figure 4-14: Optimal Safeguards Results (Two Guard Per Arc Limit), Example Problem 1 
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Figure 4-15: PFS Vs. Cost (Two Guard Limit), Example Problem 1 
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 Figure 4-16 shows a plot of UtilityPPS vs. Cost.  UtilityPPS (Eq. (3-1)) is a function 
of both Cost and PFS.  Close inspection of Figure 4-16 shows that the maximum UtilityPPS 
point is only slightly superior to another point on the graph of Cost = $230K, UtilityPPS = 
.5912.  This is an interesting point as it illustrates the importance of balancing Cost and 
PFS rather than relying on one metric to make a final decision. 
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Figure 4-16: Utility Vs. Cost, Example Problem 1 
 
 Figure 4-17 shows a Tornado diagram22 for the PPS configuration with the 
highest value of UtilityPPS using FORM analysis.  A Tornado diagram is a one-way 
sensitivity analysis which shows the effect of changing a particular variable (in this case, 
the mean value of each individual variable is multiplied by both 0.5 and 2) and 
recalculating PFS with the final safeguards configuration as shown in Figure 4-9.  The 
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bounds of the horizontal bar for each variable show the effect changing that input has on 
the final value of the objective function.  In the case of this problem, it is clear that 
variation of the safeguards’ detection probability has the greatest impact on the final PFS 
(as it has the greatest range on the Tornado diagram).  This tells the facility owner that if 
he or she does not have a large amount of confidence in his or her detection probability 
values, then the final performance of this PPS may not be as predicted.  Additionally, 
safeguards delay time and θ (location in arc of detection) have a small influence on the 
final PFS.  It is important to note, however, that the tornado diagram is scenario specific 
and changes as the network topology and input variables do.  Although expected, it is 
interesting to note that PFS can vary either in a positive or negative manner, depending on 
the fluctuation of the input variables. 
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Figure 4-17: One-Way Sensitivity Analysis (Tornado Diagram), Example Problem 1 
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4.5.4 Computational Effort 
 The main criticism of Monte Carlo simulation is its large computational effort.  
This point is illustrated in Table 4-3, where the total CPU time for safeguards 
optimization and critical path selection are shown.  The CPU used to run these 
experiments is a Dell Inspiron 5100, 2.8 GHz with 768 MB of RAM.   
 
Table 4-3: CPU Time Summary, Example Problem 1 
 FORM (s) Monte Carlo (s) 
% Reduction in CPU 
Time (with FORM) 
Existing Facility 
Analysis 
.065 .701 90.7 
Upgrades Analysis .430 11.8 96.4 
New System Design 25.0 3804.8 99.3 
 
 
 
 In this case, achieving the same results as FORM through Monte Carlo simulation 
requires significantly greater computational effort.  It is interesting to note that the 
computational savings due to Monte Carlo simulation increase as the problem complexity 
does.  Recall that the results for Monte Carlo are shown for 1,000 samples for the existing 
facility analysis and upgrades analysis and 5,000 samples for the new system design.  The 
increased number of samples for the new system design is necessary in order to stabilize 
these results when compared with FORM results.  Many techniques exist13,44 to decrease 
the required computational effort of Monte Carlo simulation such as antithetic variates, 
stratified sampling, Latin Hypercube sampling, and importance sampling, but they were 
not fully explored as they are considered outside the scope of this study.  The times 
calculated are all computing times as reported by the computer algorithm used to solve 
 90 
these problems and they can be viewed comparatively since they represent the time it 
takes to perform all of the given actions on a particular CPU.   
 The main criticism of FORM, conversely, is its inability to generate accurate 
results for highly non-linear limit states.  In all examples presented in Section 4.5, the 
results from Monte Carlo and FORM were identical, which implies that the limit state is 
not highly non-linear.  Most importantly, the goal of this study is to develop a decision-
making methodology, and the suggested configuration chosen by both methodologies is 
the same.  This could be due, however, to the simplicity of the presented problem.  
Section 4.6 explores a larger network in order to further examine the potential differences 
between Monte Carlo and FORM. 
 
4.6 Example Problem 2 
 The second example problem is shown in Figure 4-18.  In this problem, the Type 
1 safeguard (barrier) now costs $10K, otherwise all data in this problem are the same as 
in Example Problem 1, unless otherwise noted.  A key difference in this example is the 
presence of multiple potential origins and destinations for the adversary.  Multiple origins 
and destinations can be easily incorporated into the model by adding what is referred to 
as a super-origin or a super-destination, a node whose adjoining arcs are all artificial and 
have Tt = 0 and PD = 0.  These arcs connect the super-origin or super-destination to all 
potential origins or destinations, respectively.  This concept is illustrated in Figure 4-18.  
The origin can be either node 2, 7, or 12, while the destination can be either node 6, 11, 
or 16.  Figure 4-18 represents this uncertainty with a super-origin placed at O connecting 
to 2, 7, and 12 and a super-destination placed at D connecting to 6, 11, and 16.  This 
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concept should be incorporated in the network when there are multiple possible locations 
for the adversary’s origin and/or destination. 
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Figure 4-18: Network Graph, Example Problem 2 
 
 Additionally, the arcs that connect the super-origin and super-destination with the 
remainder of the network are also unable to have safeguards installed on them.  This type 
of arc is referred to as an uninterdictable arc.  It does not represent a physical part of the 
facility as it merely exists in order to facilitate analysis of a potential multiple origin or 
multiple destination facility.  In order to account for this in the mathematical 
methodology, the interdictor merely needs to add constraints to the formulation in Eq. 
(4-6) which do not allow flow across all uninterdictable arcs (i.e. constraints that force 
flow, x, across an arc to be zero). 
 As in the previous examples, MCS analyses began by using 1,000 samples 
whenever PFS was required, unless otherwise noted. 
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4.6.1 Existing Facility Analysis 
 In this problem, a random safeguards plan is generated.  The network 
corresponding to this random safeguards plan is shown Figure 4-19.  The result of the 
analysis are a PFS = .2501 and a Cost = $940K for both FORM and MC analyses. 
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Figure 4-19: Randomly Generated Network, Example Problem 2 
 
4.6.2 Upgrades Analysis 
 In the upgrades analysis, the baseline network is as shown in Figure 4-20.  This 
safeguards configuration was randomly generated.  The upgrades budget is $250K.  All 
other data are as before.  Figure 4-21 shows the results of the upgrades analysis for both 
FORM and Monte Carlo (their results are identical). 
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Figure 4-20: Baseline for Upgrades Analysis, Example Problem 2 
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Figure 4-21: Upgraded Network, Example Problem 2 
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 Figure 4-22 shows the upgraded PFS vs. Cost for Example problem 2.  It is again 
interesting to note that the point with the highest value of UtilityPPS does not occur when 
the safeguards budget is fully utilized. 
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Figure 4-22: Upgraded PFS Vs. Cost, Example Problem 2 
 
4.6.3 New System Design 
 Figure 4-23 shows the PPS configuration for the highest value of UtilityPPS for the 
network shown in Figure 4-18 when undertaking a new PPS system design using FORM.  
All variable statistics are as before in Table 4-1.  The legend corresponds to the labels 
given to the safeguards in Table 4-2.  As can be expected, this configuration requires 
significantly more safeguards when compared with Example 1.  Additionally, the 
safeguards are spread out more evenly in this problem as there are now more attack paths 
for the adversary. 
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Figure 4-23: Optimal Safeguards Results, Example Problem 2 
 
 Cost vs. PFS using FORM for this problem is shown in Figure 4-24.  In this 
example problem, Monte Carlo becomes prohibitively expensive.  As a result, Monte 
Carlo is further considered to be an impractical tool for designing a new PPS.  It was still 
used, however, to solve the upgrades analyses and existing facility analyses to verify the 
accuracy of FORM. 
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Figure 4-24: PFS Vs. Cost, Example Problem 2 
 
 Figure 4-25 shows a plot of UtilityPPS vs. Cost using the FORM analysis. 
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Figure 4-25: UtilityPPS Vs. Cost, Example Problem 2 
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 The remainder of the figures that are shown for Example 1 are not reproduced for 
Example 2 as it thought that they do not provide any further insight into the problem.  
Their presentation for the discussion of Example 1 is intended to show the capabilities of 
the developed methodology. 
 
4.6.4 Computational Effort 
 The computational times comparing FORM and Monte Carlo for safeguards 
optimization and critical path selection are illustrated in Table 4-4.  The CPU used to run 
these experiments is a Dell Inspiron 5100, 2.8 GHz with 768 MB of RAM.  It is clear that 
achieving the same results through Monte Carlo simulation requires significantly greater 
computational effort, as was the case with the examples in Section 4.5.  The times 
calculated are all computing times as reported by the computer algorithm used to solve 
these problems and they can be viewed comparatively since they represent the time it 
takes to perform all of the given actions on a particular CPU. 
 
Table 4-4: CPU Time Summary, Example Problem 2 
 
FORM (s) Monte Carlo (s) 
% Reduction in CPU 
Time (with FORM) 
Existing Facility 
Analysis 
.768 6.31 87.8 
Upgrades Analysis 61.8 3540.6 98.3 
New System Design 449.2 39674** 98.9** 
** Result shown is average of two runs of times for 1K samples and 5K samples.  Actual 
savings would be greater as number of samples would be larger. 
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4.7 Simple Practical Example 
 In this section, the results of the proposed methodology are compared to Estimate 
of Adversary Sequence Interruption (EASI) results, a method developed by Bennett10 and 
discussed in detail by Garcia39 and briefly in Section 2.1.2.1, which many security 
professionals use to evaluate a PPS interruption probability and which the proposed 
methodology bases it calculations of PI on.  The experiments focus on calculating PI for a 
given scenario, based on the adversary path shown below: 
 
 
Figure 4-26: Adversary Path, Simple Practical Example
39 
 
 This adversary path is translated into the following network: 
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Figure 4-27: Network, Simple Practical Example
39 
 
 Following are the data for the network shown in Figure 4-27.  All variables are 
normally distributed with a coefficient of variation of 0.3.  The data given are taken 
directly from Garcia39.  Bold values represent changes to the baseline scenario (Scenario 
1) in subsequent scenarios. 
 
Table 4-5: Mean PD Values 
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Table 4-6: Mean Delay Time Values (s) 
 
 
Table 4-7: Mean Response Time Values (s) 
 
 
 There are a few limitations to this example.  The scenarios do not include PN.  
Additionally, in Garcia’s example problems, guard response time is identical for all arcs.  
The methodology presented in this study is more conservative in that guards are assigned 
to a particular arc and guard response time increases as the response location is further 
from the guard’s station.  This simplification results in a more conservative value for PI 
when compared with the example problems.  This simplification is realistic, however, as 
guard response time will not be equal for each arc.  However, using the developed 
methodology (with the same assumptions as Garcia), identical PI values were calculated 
for all six examples as compared to Garcia’s values.  These PI values, for both the 
developed methodology and Garcia’s methodology, are shown below. 
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Table 4-8: Scenario PI Results 
 
 
4.8 Summary 
 The focus of this chapter was to develop a solution methodology to solve a single 
adversary attack problem.  The methodology presented expands current research 
capabilities to include multiobjective optimization by maximizing the objective of 
UtilityPPS, with the understanding that it can be adapted to fit other objective functions.  
This chapter develops a method which overcomes the computational hurdles of previous 
network interdiction methods through the following improvements: (1) decoupling of 
critical path enumeration and safeguards optimization; (2) enumeration of only a unique 
critical path set and avoidance of enumeration of paths with repeated arcs; (3) use of 
efficient analytical approximations to calculate the stochastic constraints, compared to 
expensive Monte Carlo runs; and (4) use of an efficient decoupled stochastic optimization 
technique based on the concepts of reliability-based design optimization (RBDO).  These 
improvements make it possible to solve realistic stochastic network interdiction problems 
in an efficient manner.  These computational improvements allow for the objective 
considered to incorporate timely detection, neutralization probability, and interruption 
probability, extensions to previous methods.  These improvements make solving real 
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world problems feasible.  Chapter V discusses the extension of the presented 
methodology to account for a multiple team adversary attack. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
MULTIPLE ADVERSARY TEAM METHODOLOGY 
 
 The previous chapters discussed formulations in which a single adversary team is 
attacking a facility.  The third objective of this study is to extend the single adversary 
team methodology developed in Chapters II-IV to handle multiple team attacks, an issue 
that arises as adversary teams become more organized and adversary attack scenarios 
become more complex.  This type of problem, in which multiple commodities 
(adversaries) share the same arcs within a network, is generally referred to as a 
multicommodity flow problem.  If the teams do not interact in any way, the problem can 
be solved as multiple independent single team problems.  If, however, there is some 
interaction between the adversary teams such as simultaneous travel on the same arcs, the 
adversaries’ actions are no longer independent of one another and they must be modeled 
together.  The multicommodity problem studied in this methodology has the added 
complication that the objectives of the individual teams are coupled with one another, 
that is, each team’s actions can influence the effectiveness of other teams.  It is 
impossible to separate each team’s actions, thus increasing the computational effort 
required to solve this problem. 
 Multicommodity flows have been studied in detail and Assad7 and Kennington63 
provide comprehensive surveys on the solution of these problems.  It is not difficult to 
imagine situations in which an adversary may wish to transport multiple goods through a 
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facility resulting in a multicommodity problem, but as Lim and Smith point out72, the best 
practical use of this problem formulation may involve the facility owner’s examination of 
the worst-case scenario attack.  A methodology is developed in this chapter to defend 
against the worst reasonable attack.  As discussed in Section 1.2, a reasonable attack is 
one which is developed using the Design Basis Threat1,2 analysis.  The assumptions of 
Chapter IV are maintained throughout this chapter with the exception that the adversary 
threat is now treated as being a multiple team threat. 
 Use of multicommodity flow techniques to solve the facility protection 
optimization problem has to address three issues: 1) analysis of multiple adversary team 
attack strategies to include simultaneous and sequential adversary attacks, 2) 
development of a coupled implicit objective function, and 3) calculation of overall 
system-level reliability.  The following section discusses the development of a 
methodology which can incorporate these concerns, by analyzing the influence of 
multiple teams on the methodology developed in Chapter IV. 
 
5.1 Multiple Adversary Team Methodology 
 The standard multicommodity flow formulation3 is for a problem in which the 
objective is to minimize overall transport cost (of all commodities), and is stated as 
follows: 
∑∑
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where 
r
ic  is the transport cost of the r
th commodity across the ith arc, 
r
ix  is a variable 
indicating flow of the rth commodity across the ith arc, and R is the set of commodities. 
 In the proposed methodology, the multiple adversary teams are assumed to be 
identical.  That is, they each have the same capabilities and any two teams perform the 
same task in equal time with an equal detection probability.  If the problem were to have 
non-identical adversaries, its complexity would increase significantly.  Consider a two-
team, two-path scenario for illustration.  With homogenous teams, team A traveling on 
path 1 and team B traveling on path 2 yield the same PFS as team A traveling on path 2 
and team B traveling on path 1.  Thus, only the first scenarios must be evaluated.  
Heterogeneity amongst teams, however, means that all scenario combinations must be 
analyzed. 
 If the objective function in the multicommodity flow problem is linear, as in Eq. 
(5-1), the problem can be solved through price-directive decomposition, resource-
directive decomposition, or partitioning methods (see Chapter 17 in Ahuja3).  The 
formulation shown in Eq. (5-1) can be adapted to optimize any objective function in 
which the individual adversary objectives are not coupled.  For example, if the goal is 
minimize the total cost of transporting multiple commodities across a network and there 
are no flow restrictions present, then the formulation shown in Eq. (5-1) merely seeks to 
find the best path for multiple commodities simultaneously.  Some approaches have been 
developed for nonlinear uncoupled multicommodity problems.  Lim and Smith72 and 
Castro and Nabona17 provide examples of this work.  Recall, however, from Section 3.2 
that the objective of the problem in this study is to maximize UtilityPPS subject to cost and 
performance constraints.  This problem is coupled for multiple teams, that is, interaction 
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effects between teams prevent the problem from being decomposed into k separable 
problems.  Multicommodity problems have not been solved using coupled (non-
separable) objectives such as this.  As a result, a more complicated problem formulation 
must be developed.   
 Previous work3,6,17,72 on multicommodity flows has not modeled the ability of the 
multiple commodities to assist (or hinder) one another, thereby lowering (or raising) the 
commodities’ overall likelihood of failure.  An example of this type of situation would be 
two individuals who are trying to infiltrate a facility for sabotage.  It is conceivable that 
the travel time of the two individuals working together could be greatly reduced due to 
their cooperation with one another, but that their detection probability may increase.  As 
such, a complete network model must be able to deal with both helpful and hurtful 
consequences of simultaneous flow. 
 Given that the scenario of multiple individuals working together on the same task 
seems likely, especially in the area of facility protection in which multiple adversary 
teams may work with one another to attack a facility, multiple team interaction must be 
addressed.  The interaction of multiple adversarial teams is decomposed into three key 
components: (1) shared time in which teams work together on the same arc in a network 
(Section 5.1.1), (2) development of the scenarios in which multiple teams may interact 
(Section 5.1.2), and (3) overall objective function calculation (Section 5.1.3).  The next 
three sections discuss these concepts in detail.   
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5.1.1 Shared Time 
 If the analyst is attempting to solve the problem of multiple team cooperation with 
regards to a real-world problem, the paths in which multiple teams may split up into are 
numerous.  For a practical facility, these path combinations are a difficult combinatorial 
problem to solve.  In order to analyze only a select group of paths which are of 
importance to the facility’s protection, the analyst must develop a critical path set (CPS).  
This CPS selection is straightforward with regards to a single team, as shown in Section 
4.1.  While the same procedure is followed in a facility that requires multiple team 
cooperation, the choice of paths becomes significantly more difficult, as the interaction 
effects between the multiple teams must be taken into account.  When multiple teams are 
introduced and there are potential interaction effects of the teams, however, both 
adversary task (i.e. travel) time and location are important.  If a simple multicommodity 
analysis is performed without regard for task (i.e. travel) time and location in the facility, 
the interaction effects of multiple teams may be over- or underestimated with regards to 
one another.  This concept is illustrated for two adversary teams in Figure 5-1 (Teams 1 
and 2 in Figure 5-1 have origins of O1 and O2, respectively, and share a destination of D; 
the times shown in the figure represent mean task times): 
 
 
Figure 5-1: Multicommodity Interaction Illustration 
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 Without a representation of the teams that includes both task (i.e. travel) times 
and location in the facility, one would think that the teams would interact on arcs B-C and 
C-D.  Looking at the task times in Figure 5-1, however, one realizes that team 2 arrives at 
its final destination, D, well before team 1 completes its first task, assuming that team 2 
will not wait for team 1.  For this reason, there is no interaction between the two despite 
the fact that the two teams are traveling on the same path.  This simple illustration 
demonstrates the importance of considering both task time and location within the facility 
when dealing with multiple teams. 
Another way of looking at this interaction is by comparing the time of early finish 
(TEF), the time when the first team finishes a given task, the time of early start (TES), the 
time when the first team starts a given task, the time of late finish (TLF), the time when 
the 2nd team finishes a given task, and the time of late start (TLS), the time when the 2
nd 
team starts a given task.  In order to take credit for shared time, TEF needs to be greater 
than TLS, i.e. the later team starts before the earlier team finishes.  Shared time represents 
time across an arc in which two or more adversaries are traveling on the arc at once, as 
shown in Figure 5-2. 
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Figure 5-2: Graphical Depiction of Shared Time Concept 
 
 The concept of shared time is extremely important as real-world multicommodity 
problems involve this situation quite often.  It should be noted that this discussion 
assumes two adversary teams, but it is possible to expand the discussion to more, as 
discussed later in this section. 
 Using Figure 5-2, TEF is defined as: 
∑
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where )( riTE  is the expected travel time for commodity r across arc i, ENDST  is the node at 
the end of the shared time arc, rix  is the flow of the r
th team across arc i (this is either 0 or 
1).  Only the times on the chosen path are to be included. 
 Using Figure 5-2, TLS is defined as: 
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where STARTST  is the node at the start of the shared time arc and all else is as before. 
Using Figure 5-2, shared time, ST, is defined as: 
LSEF TTST −=  (5-6) 
Therefore, the statistics of shared time can be calculated as: 
)()()( LSEF TETESTE −≈  (5-7) 
)],([2)()()( LSEFLSEF TTCovTVarTVarSTVar −+≈  (5-8) 
The above idea can be generalized for more than two teams.  In that case, E(ST)ikm 
represents the average shared time between teams k and m across arc i.  The shared time 
between each pair of teams on each arc is calculated.  For example, if a scenario has three 
adversary teams and they are interacting on one arc, the interaction effects of Team 1 
with Team 2 and Team 1 with Team 3 are calculated in order to determine the total effect 
of shared time on Team 1.  The effect of this shared time is then combined for this arc in 
order to account for the total influence of all teams.  This shared time combination is 
discussed in Section 5.1.3. 
It is not difficult to extend this methodology to non-normal variables if 
desired12,73,78,90,92.  With all normal variables, however, P(ST>0) can be expressed as: 
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 While shared time is conceptually simple, it becomes difficult to incorporate this 
concept into the overall critical path selection and safeguards’ optimization procedures.  
The following section addresses these concerns. 
 
5.1.2 Scenario Development 
 The next question of interest is how shared time and multiple team interaction 
affect travel time and detection probability.  Teams can interact either simultaneously or 
sequentially.  Simultaneous teams operate within a facility at the same time and these 
teams can have either the same or different missions (defined simply in terms of each 
team’s origin and destination).  A simultaneous attack is a scenario in which many teams 
are working together to accomplish multiple simultaneous goals.  Examples may be one 
team acting as a diversion while another team detonates a bomb in a facility or two teams 
with two independent targets such as two separate facilities or different targets within a 
facility.  Additionally, two teams can be assigned the same origins and destinations in an 
attempt to ensure redundancy among the adversaries in case one team is neutralized.  
Typically these scenarios provide multiple chances for adversary success.  That is, any of 
the teams accomplishing their goal can be considered a success by the adversary.  This is 
conservative from a physical protection standpoint.  In terms of the overall objective of 
the security system, then, success in stopping all teams is required in order for the 
security system to be considered successful.  That is, if any of the adversary teams 
succeed, the PPS is considered a failure.  If Er represents the event in which an adversary 
is successfully interrupted and neutralized by the security system and rE  represents a so-
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called failure event, in which an adversary defeats the security system (the complement 
of Er), where rE  = 1 – Er, then PFS can be generalized as follows: 
)( r
r
FS EPP ∪=  (5-10) 
 Eq. (5-10) may be rewritten as 
)(1)...(1)...()( 321321 r
r
rrr
r
FS EPEEEEPEEEEPEPP ∩−=−==∪=  (5-11) 
 The multiplication rule of probability for dependent events must then be used.  
For r events, the multiplication rule can be used to write: 
)()(),...,,...,(),...,(),...,( 1322121 rrrrrr EPEEPEEEPEEEPEEEP −=  (5-12) 
 For a single team, 
)(1 1EPPFS −=  (5-13) 
as discussed in Section 2.1.2. 
 For two simultaneous teams, PFS can be expressed as  
)]()|([1)(1 22121 EPEEPEEPPFS −=−=  (5-14) 
 For more than two teams, analytical computation of the joint probability of more 
than two events is difficult and can be solved numerically using Monte Carlo simulation 
or numerical integration methods82.  Alternatively, approximate bounds have been 
developed such as first-order bounds by Ang and Amin4 and Cornell27 as follows: 
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 In the above equation, the lower bound corresponds to the system failure case in 
which individual events are perfectly dependent and the upper bound represents the 
system failure probability if all the events are mutually exclusive.  Haldar and 
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Mahadevan52 point out that the first-order bounds can be quite wide.  Narrower, second-
order bounds were derived by Ditlevsen30 as 
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(5-16) 
 The events need to be ranked in order of decreasing likelihood in order to result in 
the narrowest bounds on the failure probability.  This would make )( 1EP  the highest 
probability event.  Since we are concerned with the worst-case scenario for the 
adversaries, this analysis focuses on the upper bound and designs the PPS based on this 
limit. 
 In addition to simultaneous teams, helper team scenarios (also known as 
sequential scenarios) allow for scenarios in which one team is the primary and other 
teams are referred to as secondary (or helper) teams.  Helper teams attempt their tasks 
(e.g. disabling a closed-circuit television monitor or propping an access door open) prior 
to the start of the simultaneous teams’ mission.  These tasks influence the underlying 
facility network in some way (i.e. by lowering detection probability or task time across an 
arc).  The success of the primary team is ultimately all that matters, while the secondary 
teams exist solely to support the mission of the leader.  Even if all the helper teams fail, 
the primary team can still accomplish its mission; the drawback to the adversary is that 
his or her mission becomes significantly more difficult.  This approach to helper teams is 
conservative.  In reality, failure by a helper team may negatively influence the mission of 
the simultaneous teams either directly (by not lowering detection probability or task time) 
or indirectly (by altering the response force to an impending attack).  
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 Additionally, scenarios may arise in which there are a combination of helper and 
simultaneous teams.  For instance, two primary teams may need to breach a wall at the 
same location and a helper team may be employed to create an opening in the wall prior 
to the primary teams’ arrival (in order to make the primary teams’ task easier). 
 This situation can be generalized to r primary teams, where PFS is defined as the 
failure due to the optimal adversary scenario as: 
r
FS
Rr
FS PP
∈
= max  (5-17) 
 It is worth noting in the above equation that there is no consideration for the 
helper teams in the overall scenario PFS.  As previously stated, while secondary teams 
assist the primary teams’ overall goal, their success is not essential to overall adversary 
mission success. 
 The factors that influence how task time and detection probability change in the 
presence of multiple teams are the simultaneous primary team time factor (STTF), 
simultaneous primary team detection factor (STDF), helper team time factor (HTTF), and 
helper team detection factor (HTDF).  These factors can be defined based on a per-task 
basis, but for simplicity’s sake, they are assumed for the remainder of this study to be 
constant for a particular facility.  Each of these factors can range from [-1,1].  These 
factors can be thought of as a relative value of efficiency of additional teams and they are 
defined based on study into the effects of multiple teams or the user’s best estimate.  In 
the case where STTF=0, there is no added benefit or detriment of having multiple teams.  
If the time to complete the given task is E(ST), then that is the total task time, regardless 
of the number of teams.  A STTF of greater than 0 means that the presence of multiple 
teams hinders one another and raises the overall task time to greater than the original 
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time.  A negative STTF means that the presence of additional teams is speeding up the 
completion of the given task.  An example of a task that may have a negative STTF 
would be breaching a wall.  Once an opening has been created in the wall, it does not 
need to be recreated for multiple teams.  On the other hand, a safeguard such as a security 
checkpoint could have a positive STDF since increasing the number of adversaries 
attempting to gain access through the checkpoint increases the likelihood they are caught.   
 HTTF is defined in the same manner as STTF as a measure of helper team 
efficiency in altering task time.  HTDF is defined in the same manner as HTTF as a 
measure of helper team efficiency in altering detection probability.   
 The following section discusses how to incorporate the effects of both sequential 
and simultaneous teams into the overall UtilityPPS calculation.   
 
5.1.3 Mathematical Model of UtilityPPS 
 Given the presence of multiple teams, calculation of UtilityPPS can no longer be 
represented in a closed form, as in Eq. (3-1).  Expanding the model developed in Chapter 
IV using the concepts developed in the last two sections, the objective function becomes 
implicit and follows the general outline below (with details to follow): 
1. Calculate effect of helper teams on primary simultaneous teams. 
2. Calculate shared time amongst primary simultaneous teams. 
3. Calculate effect of primary simultaneous teams on one another. 
4. Calculate TG. 
5. Calculate PN. 
6. Calculate PTD. 
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7. Calculate system level PFS for each scenario of teams amongst paths (e.g. 
worst path set for 2 simultaneous primary teams, etc.) 
8. Determine overall PFS among different scenarios of teams (e.g. 1 helper team, 
1 primary team; 2 simultaneous primary teams) 
9. Calculate UtilityPPS 
 Helper teams involve two key concepts which must be addressed before 
incorporating them into the methodology.  Since they perform work prior to the leader’s 
arrival, there is a chance they may succeed or fail.  If they succeed, their work impacts 
the adversary in some form.  If they fail, their work can have a detrimental effect 
(although it is conservatively assumed in this methodology that capturing a helper team 
does not further alert the response force to an impending attack on the facility, as the 
methodology is designing for a worst case scenario.  Another approach would be to 
assume that helper team detection results in primary team mission failure). So, first the 
success of the helper teams must be analyzed.  This is done by analyzing the helper teams 
as a group of simultaneous teams, calculating PFS for each team.  Probability of helper 
success is defined through the complement PHS = 1 – PFS.  This value is then used, along 
with HTTF and HTDF in determining the helper team’s effects on PD (see Eq. (3-6) for 
PD derivation) and T as follows: 
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where h is the helper team index, H is the set of helper teams, Ti is the i
th task time, Tl is 
the delay time due to lth safeguard, and all else is as before in Chapter IV.  The 
summation present in Eqs. (5-19) and (5-20) aggregate the effect of multiple helper 
teams. 
 Once the updated detection probabilities and travel times have been calculated, 
the next step is to calculate the shared time amongst the simultaneous teams.  Expected 
shared time is calculated based on Eq. (5-7) for each combination of arcs and teams.  
Then, the effect that shared time has on the baseline PD and T is calculated as follows: 
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(5-22) 
The above equations correspond to a weighted sum of the non-shared time on an arc and 
the shared time, multiplied by the multiple team adjustment factors (STDF and STTF).  
The summation present in the numerator Eqs. (5-21) and (5-22) aggregate the effect of 
multiple simultaneous teams.  
 If shared time is equal to the total travel time (including the sum of baseline and 
delay due to safeguards, as shown in the denominator) for an arc, then Eqs. (5-21) and 
(5-22) equations reduce to: 
{ }iDD STDFPP iik += 1  (5-23) 
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{ }iiik STTFTT += 1  (5-24) 
On the other hand, if no shared time exists on an arc, Eqs. (5-21) and (5-22) reduce to 
iik DD
PP =  and iik TT = .  likDP  and Tlik for the safeguards are calculated in a similar manner 
to the above equations, with 
liD
P  and Tli replacing iDP  and Ti in Eqs. (5-21) and (5-22) to 
the left of the outside brackets. 
 Once the updated detection probabilities and travel times are calculated (both 
baseline and safeguards), the next step is to calculate guard response time and probability 
of neutralization.  This process follows the same procedure as shown in Section 3.2.1.3, 
with the only difference being that the presence of multiple adversary teams (at multiple 
locations or the same location) results in the guard response force potentially being 
further dispersed, as the same number of guards is now attempting to neutralize a larger 
number of adversaries.  This dispersion means that there are on average less response 
force personnel to engage in neutralization for each adversary.  For instance, if there are 
two potential adversary paths in a facility, in a scenario in which the adversaries will 
travel down separate paths, the guard forces will split up to neutralize both adversaries.  
As a result, the probability of neutralization for the guard response force decreases (as PN 
is based on the number of adversaries compared with the number of response force 
personnel, as in Eqs. (3-9) and (3-10)).  In other words, achieving the same level of 
neutralization for a multiple adversary attack requires additional response force 
personnel, and therefore, a higher safeguards budget. 
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 The next step is to calculate the probability of timely detection.  The procedure is 
the same as outlined in Eq. (3-7) with the only addition being that the probability of 
timely detection must be calculated for each team on each arc. 
 Once all of the above calculations have been performed, they can be combined to 
compute PFS for each path set (e.g. primary teams 1 and 2 travel on path A, primary team 
1 travels on path A and primary team 2 travels on path B, etc.), as shown in Eq. (3-5).  
This calculation is performed for each set of paths identified during the critical path 
selection process.  This calculation is also performed for each combination of helper and 
simultaneous teams up to the maximum number of teams specified in the analysis.  It is 
assumed that the adversary teams utilize the maximum number of teams specified in the 
Design Basis Threat1,2 in order to maximize their effectiveness.  This information for real 
facilities is classified, but in the event that an analyst performs this analysis on a facility, 
he or she would have access to this data.  Therefore, sub-optimal scenarios (i.e. one in 
which the adversary only utilizes two teams when the Design Basis Threat allows for 
three teams) are ignored.  The worst case value of PFS is retained for each scenario.  This 
results in a table similar to the one shown below for an example with three paths sets for 
each scenario and three teams (the example below is shown entirely for illustrative 
purposes and does not correspond to any problem in this study): 
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Table 5-1: Example Multiple Team PFS Results 
Adversary 
Configuration 
Path Set 1 Path Set 2 Path Set 3 Worst-Case 
Path 
1 primary team, 2 
helper teams 
0.2 0.15 0.3 0.3 
2 simultaneous primary 
teams, 1 helper team 
0.1 0.05 0.15 0.15 
3 simultaneous primary 
teams, 0 helper teams 
0.26 0.32 0.15 0.32 
 
 
 
 The path sets shown in the above table are not the same between adversary 
configurations, i.e. Path Set 1 for 1 primary team, 2 helper teams ≠ Path Set 1 for 2 
simultaneous primary teams, 1 helper teams.  Figure 5-3 shows an example network with 
Path A (O-2-3-5-D) and Path B (O-2-4-D).  Path set 1 for the adversary configuration of 
1 primary team, 2 helper teams in the above table may correspond to primary team 1 
traveling on path A, with helper team 1 helping on O-2 and helper team 2 helping on 2-3.  
Path set 1 for the adversary configuration of 3 simultaneous primary teams may 
correspond to all three primary teams traveling on Path A.  The important point is to 
enumerate all possibilities for each adversary configuration and determine the 
configuration and path set which results in the most vulnerable attack.  This corresponds 
to Steps 7 and 8 in the objective function outline discussed previously.  
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Figure 5-3: Example Network 
 
 Once the worst-case path is identified for each scenario, the overall PFS is then 
chosen as the worst case PFS for the set of scenarios.  The reason for choosing this 
approach is that the analyst realizes that he or she does not know which configuration and 
path the adversary will choose to use, but he or she assumes that the adversary will 
choose the scenario which gives them the greatest likelihood of success.  Using the above 
example, the overall PFS for three teams would be 0.32. 
 The multiple team analysis results in the following overall problem statement 
(based on the single team analysis in Eq. (3-3)): 
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where all variables are as before. 
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 This problem statement decomposes into the following optimization at each cost 
step, n (similar to Eq. (4-6)):  
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where all variables are as before.  The optimization is performed over R, the set of 
adversary scenarios, and CPS, the critical path set, in order to ensure the resulting 
safeguards plan protects against the worst case path (and all others). 
 The solution of the above problem formulation follows the same solution 
procedure as outlined in Chapter IV for a single team analysis.  Examination of the 
calculation of PFS for multiple team analysis shows that the single team adversary 
analysis is a special case of the multiple team analysis in which steps 1-3 and 8 are 
eliminated from the process outlined at the beginning of this section. 
 For the remainder of this study, all results shown are based entirely on FORM 
results and do not include Monte Carlo analysis, as Chapter IV demonstrated both 
methodologies yield the same optimal decisions.  Additionally, the results for the 
remainder of this chapter focus on new system design.   As it is the most comprehensive 
analysis of the three, both existing facility and upgrades analyses are assumed to be 
feasible. 
 Following are two example problems.  They represent the same two facilities 
from Chapter IV, each being analyzed as a new facility PPS design combating a multiple 
team adversary attack. 
 
 123 
5.2 Example Problem 1 
 In this example problem, Example Problem 1 from Section 4.5 is revisited.  
Figure 5-4 shows the network from this problem, with all primary teams having the same 
origin (O) and destination (D).  A new system design is undertaken for 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 
teams in order to show the difference in performance among these different scenarios.  
For each of these scenarios, all combination of helper and simultaneous teams up to the 
maximum number of teams were utilized (i.e. for a two adversary team threat, scenarios 
are 1 primary team, 1 helper team and 2 primary simultaneous teams, 0 helper teams).  
Observe that the results from Section 4.5 are utilized here as the results for a single team. 
Figure 5-5 shows the Cost vs. PFS curve for the multiple team experiment.  Figures 5-5 
through 5-9 show the safeguards plans corresponding to the maximum UtilityPPS for the 
different adversary threats. 
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Figure 5-4: Multiple Adversary Example Problem 1 
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Figure 5-5: PF Vs. Cost, Multiple Adversary Example Problem 1 
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Figure 5-6: Maximum UtilityPPS Configuration, Multiple Adversary Example Problem 1, 
Single Adversary Team 
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Figure 5-7: Maximum UtilityPPS Configuration, Multiple Adversary Example Problem 1, 
Two Adversary Teams  
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Figure 5-8: Maximum UtilityPPS Configuration, Multiple Adversary Example Problem 1, 
Three Adversary Teams 
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Figure 5-9: Maximum UtilityPPS Configuration, Multiple Adversary Example Problem 1, 
Four Adversary Teams 
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Figure 5-10: Maximum UtilityPPS Configuration, Multiple Adversary Example Problem 1, 
Five Adversary Teams 
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 As is expected, the resultant performance of the security system worsens as the 
number of adversary teams increases.  This makes sense as more adversary teams are 
likely to be more successful in defeating a given security system.  In turn, this requires a 
greater response force to combat an increased adversary force.  It is interesting to note 
that, as the number of adversaries increases in Figure 5-5, the highest UtilityPPS point of 
each scenario shifts further from the origin (up and to the right), meaning that a greater 
cost is required to achieve the same level of performance.  In order to combat the low 
performance of the PPS against a greater number of adversaries, the facility owner can 
experiment with allowing multiple guards on each arc, as discussed in Section 4.5.1.  An 
experiment showing the results of allowing two guards per arc for a two team analysis is 
shown below.  As expected, allowing two guards per arc results in a higher UtilityPPS 
value (as indicated by the two guards per arc curve being lower and to the left of the one 
guard per arc curve). 
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Figure 5-11: PFS Vs. Cost (Two Guard Limit), Two Adversary Example Problem 1 
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  CPU times and ratios of safeguards optimization and critical path selection are 
summarized in Table 5-2 below.  The CPU used to run these experiments is a Dell 
Inspiron 5100, 2.8 GHz with 768 MB of RAM.  As can be expected, the computational 
effort increases significantly as the number of adversaries increases.  
  
Table 5-2: CPU Time Summary, Multiple Adversary Example Problem 1 
 
Time (s) 
Ratio (Relative to 1 
Team) 
1 Team 25.0 1 
2 Teams 160.2 6.41 
3 Teams 603.1 24.12 
4 Teams 1729.2 69.17 
5 Teams 3729.1 149.16 
 
 
 
 The information presented in Table 5-2 is shown graphically in Figure 5-12 in 
order to demonstrate the exponential rise in computational time as the number of 
adversary teams increases.  This figure is not meant to act as a deterrent to the analyst.  
The intent is to reinforce the understanding that the complicated analysis and in-depth 
information generated by undertaking a multiple team adversary analysis comes with the 
price of increased computational effort.  However, use of FORM made this analysis 
possible, whereas Monte Carlo simulation would have been impossible. 
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Figure 5-12: CPU Time Comparison, Multiple Adversary Example Problem 1 
 
 
 
5.3 Example Problem 2 
 In this example, Problem 2 from Section 4.6 is revisited.  Figure 5-13 shows the 
network from this problem.  A new system design was attempted for 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 
teams in order to show the difference in performance among these different scenarios.  
Observe that the results from Section 4.6 are utilized here as the results for a single team.  
The analyses for 4 and 5 teams, however, did not succeed due to computational 
limitations as a result of the large number of potential attack scenarios present when 
analyzing more than one team.  As the number of teams increase, this value increases 
exponentially, as demonstrated in Figure 5-12.  Thus, it is inferred that this methodology 
is only effective for new facility design for real-world problems for up to three teams.  
This conclusion is again evaluated in Chapter VI, when the hypothetical facility is 
analyzed.  However, the proposed methodology still represents an improvement over 
current stochastic network interdiction techniques26,59,81,94 (refer to Section 3.3) which can 
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only address attacks by a single adversary and for a limited objective function.  
Additionally, the use of FORM, as discussed in the previous section, makes this analysis 
possible, whereas Monte Carlo based methods prevent these problems from being 
analyzed. 
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Figure 5-13: Multiple Adversary Example Problem 2 
 
 Figure 5-14 shows the Cost vs. PFS curve for this experiment. 
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Figure 5-14: PF Vs. Cost, Multiple Adversary Example Problem 2 
 
 
 
 As is expected, the resultant performance of the security system worsens as the 
number of adversary teams increases.  The performance worsens at a quicker rate with 
multiple teams when compared with Example Problem 1.  This may be due to the fact 
that there are more attack paths in this problem and, as a result, it is more difficult to 
defend against all of these potential attacks.  Again, in order to combat the low 
performance of the PPS against a greater number of adversaries, the facility owner can 
experiment with allowing multiple guards on each arc, as discussed in Section 4.5.1 and 
shown again for the previous example problem. 
  CPU times and ratios of safeguards optimization and critical path selection are 
summarized in Table 5-3 below.  The CPU used to run these experiments is a Dell 
Inspiron 5100, 2.8 GHz with 768 MB of RAM.  As can be expected, the computational 
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effort increases significantly as the number of adversaries increases.  The three team 
analysis in this case takes 29.5 hours to complete.   
 
Table 5-3: CPU Time Summary, Multiple Adversary Example Problem 2 
 
Time (s) 
Ratio (Relative to 1 
Team) 
1 Team 449.15 1 
2 Teams 11674 25.99 
3 Teams 106,150 236.33 
 
 
 
 The information presented in the above table is shown graphically in Figure 5-15 
in order to demonstrate the exponential rise in computational time as the number of 
adversary teams increases. 
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Figure 5-15: CPU Time Comparison, Multiple Adversary Example Problem 2 
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5.4 Summary 
 This chapter utilized the computational methods proposed made in Chapter IV to 
develop a methodology to handle multiple adversary teams in facility protection system 
optimization.  In doing so, the problem’s complexity increases significantly.  The 
presence of multiple teams complicates 1) modeling of adversary attack strategies, 
including simultaneous and sequential adversary attacks and 2) development of a 
complex coupled implicit objective function that includes calculation of overall system-
level reliability.  These complications result in a significant increase in the computational 
effort required to design a facility protection system when compared with the single team 
methodology presented in the previous chapter.  This chapter included discussion of all of 
these concepts.  It was then proven useful through demonstration on two example 
problems.  Chapter VI demonstrates the proposed methodology on a problem of real 
world complexity. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
DEMONSTRATION OF METHODOLOGY 
 
6.1 Hypothetical Facility Overview 
 The final goal of this study is to assess the effectiveness of the proposed facility 
protection methodology by applying it to a problem modeled after a real world scenario.  
Garcia has provided a hypothetical facility41, designed to closely emulate operations at a 
real critical facility, for use in testing the methodology developed in Chapters II-V.  The 
fictional facility, Hartley International Transportation Hub (Hartley Hub), is located in a 
medium-sized city in the southwestern United States (designed to emulate Albuquerque, 
NM), designed for the year 2010.  The hub contains an airport, a rail cargo center, a 
trucking center, an air cargo terminal, a secure cargo area, and a police substation.  Each 
of these individual areas has its own security force. 
 A map of the area surrounding Hartley Hub is provided below:   
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 A map detailing the response force locations at Hartley Hub is provided below:  
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Figure 6-2: Hartley Hub Response Force Locations
41
 
 
 
 In Hartley Hub, the area which the facility protection optimization focuses on is 
the Secure Cargo Area (SCA), which is shown in detail in Figure 6-3.  This figure 
includes dimensions which are used to calculate travel times for the facility network.  
Travel times (by foot) are calculated based on assuming a sprinter can run at an average 
sprint speed of 80% of the current world record for the 100 m dash58 (9.77 s, or 10.235 
m/s).  This corresponds to a sprint speed of 8.19 m/s in open areas.  Travel times (by car) 
are calculated based on assuming vehicle drivers travel at 20 miles/hr within the 
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perimeter of the facility, or an average driving speed of 8.94 m/s in open areas.  Travel 
times are then calculated accordingly. 
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Figure 6-3: Secure Cargo Area (SCA) 
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6.2 Hypothetical Facility Operations 
 The SCA is open Monday through Friday from 5 AM until midnight.  The facility 
is intended to be a temporary storage location for items such as prototype 
microelectronics, precious metals or gems, drugs seized as evidence or money being 
taken out of circulation, considered high value assets.  Biological agents, such as anthrax, 
Ebola virus samples, and some radioactive substances are stored in a special controlled 
room within the SCA.  Figure 6-4 and Figure 6-5 show the physical protection systems 
elements in place for the exterior and interior of the SCA, respectively. 
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Figure 6-4: Secure Cargo Area —Exterior Protection Plan
41
 
 139 
 
Office 
Portal 
Controlled  
Room 
Badge Reader  
(mag stripe)  
Hand Geometry 
Vault 
Area 
Room 
Staging  
* * 
* * 
* 
*  *  
* 
* * 
* 
 
30 cm thick reinforced concrete   
  
1.6 mm thick steel door (standard industrial grade) with 
balanced magnetic switch and embedded grid mesh  
  
microwave sensor  
  
CCTV (fixed-position; no motion detection)  
  
V1-8, storage vaults; material (sides and top) are vinyl- 
coated 3 mm x 50 mm mesh 
* 
 
Figure 6-5: Secure Cargo Area —Exterior Protection Plan
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 The security force at the SCA consists of three security officers during normal 
operating hours, while two officers are on duty when the facility is closed.  During 
normal operations, one officer operates the central alarm system, one operates the 
personnel entry, and one watches the vehicle entry portal.  When the facility is closed, 
one officer operates the alarm system and one is on random patrol.  Entering personnel 
must pass through a personnel portal, which consists of a badge exchange, metal detector 
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and an explosives detector.  All entering and exiting vehicles are searched via a vehicle 
portal. 
 The Cargo Storage Building at the SCA includes a Vault Area, which contains a 
Controlled Room, which holds biological, chemical, and radiological samples.  The Vault 
Area may be accessed either through a door at the right off the Staging Area or through a 
door between the Office Area and Vault Area.  The second door is opened through a 
magnetic stripe badge reader and a hand geometry sensor.  No material (such as 
radiological material from the vault) may pass through this door; all material must pass 
through the Staging Area.  Within the Vault Area is a Controlled Room, which holds 
environmental chambers for the storage of biological and radiological goods. 
 The Staging Area of the SCA is accessed through a vehicle-sized roll-up door.  
During operating hours, the roll-up door remains open and unlocked and the balanced 
magnetic switch that acts as a detector is set to “access”, preventing it from detecting any 
intruders.  Outside of the SCA is a dual-gate vehicle barrier which requires independent 
gate opening. 
 There are approximately 60 employees at the SCA.  The workforce includes a 
Facility Manager, a Security Manager, an Operations Managers, engineers and 
technicians, material handlers, clerks, secretaries, custodians, and security officers.  Also, 
on occasion, subcontractors are allowed to enter the facility to perform maintenance and 
emergency repair work, such as HVAC, computers, machinery, etc. 
 The primary response force for the SCA is the local police, whose headquarters 
are located at R2 (refer to Figure 6-2).  The local police are also responsible for the 
protection of the airport, the remainder of Hartley Hub, and other areas of the city.  
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Accordingly, it takes them 20 minutes to respond to an attack on the SCA.  When alerted 
by the dispatcher that the SCA is under attack, all eight police officers who patrol the city 
are instructed to return to police headquarters.  The first four to arrive at headquarters 
become the response force for the incident, while the remaining officers are released back 
to normal patrol.  The officers collect their gear, discuss their plan, and proceed to the 
SCA as a group.  Once they arrive at the SCA, they contact the local SCA security officer 
in accordance with established procedures.  The response procedure for SCA Response 
Force is as follows: 
1. An alarm in the SCA is detected. 
2. A local officer (in the control room) assesses the alarm to determine whether or 
not it is an actual intrusion.  The action takes 0.5 minutes. 
3. The local officer reports the incident to the police force at R2.  This action takes 
0.3 minutes. 
4. The local officer communicates to other R3 officers to take action.  This action 
takes 1.5 minutes. 
5. R2 alerts response personnel to report to R2. 
6. Response force at R2 collects equipment. 
7. Response team travels to R3.  Actions 5-7 take 11.7 minutes. 
8. R2 officers deploy and proceed with interruption of adversary.  This action takes 
1.5 minutes. 
 If only local response is necessary, only actions 1-4 and 8 are required.  If off-site 
response is required, all actions are necessary.  In order to simplify calculations, local 
response actions are combined into one individual action with local action being 
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described as a truncated normal with mean of the travel time to reach the destination plus 
2.3 minutes (the result of actions 1-4).  Offsite police force actions are combined into one 
action described as a truncated normal with mean of 15.5 minutes and a standard 
deviation of 1.55 minutes. 
 The staffing associated with the security personnel is summarized below: 
 
Table 6-1: Response Force Staffing 
  No. of Officers 
Response Force Description Workdays 
Nights and 
Weekends 
R1 Airport Terminal Alarm Station 3 3 
R2 Police Substation (Response Force Headquarters) 10* 10 
R3 Secure Cargo Area 3 2 
R4 Trucking Center 1 1 
R5 Cargo Area 1 1 
  18 17 
*Includes site response team 
 
 
 
 It is assumed that the only security personnel that respond to an incident in the 
SCA are the R3 response force (on-site response) and the R2 response force (off-site 
police, if necessary). 
 Table 6-2 shows the performance data assumed for the safeguards in place in the 
existing facility described in the hypothetical facility41.  These values are assumed in 
order to avoid potential classification issues.  Cost data are assumed to be the net present 
value of life cycle costs, including installation, operations, and maintenance. 
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Table 6-2: Safeguards Data 
 
Element PD 
Delay Time 
(s) 
Cost ($100K) 
CCTV .1 0 1 
CCTV with Motion Capture .5 10 5 
Microwave Sensor .5 30 5 
Reinforced Door with 
Balanced Magnetic Switch 
.25 10 1 
Personnel Portal .5 60 5 
D
et
ec
to
rs
 
Vehicle Portal .5 60 5 
On-Site Guard #1 .85 60 20 
R
es
p
o
n
se
 
F
o
rc
e 
On-Site Guard #2 .85 60 20 
Reinforced Concrete Walls 0 150 1 
Chain Link Fence with 
Razor Wire 
0 60 1 
Fence Motion Sensor .25 30 5 B
a
rr
ie
rs
 
Anti-Vehicle Barrier 0 90 1 
 
 
 
 Figure 6-3 was transformed into a task-based network topology (shown in Figure 
6-6 with arc numbers shown in parentheses) in order to utilize the methodology 
developed in Chapters II-V.  While an attack involving theft of materials in the controlled 
room (refer to Figure 6-3) is possible, scenarios which involve sabotage are more 
conservative as the potential for response force personnel to interrupt the adversary 
decreases significantly since there are less tasks for the adversary to perform to achieve 
mission success.  As a result, analysis of the hypothetical facility focuses on sabotage 
scenarios.  The performance level achieved against a sabotage scenario provides a lower 
limit for performance achieved in protecting against a theft scenario. 
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Figure 6-6: Hypothetical Facility Network for Sabotage 
 
 The following sections discuss solution of this problem in three steps: 1) 
evaluation of the effectiveness of the existing security system, 2) upgrades analysis, and 
3) optimal design of a new security system.  Specific Design Basis Threat1,2 data for a 
particular facility is classified, so the adversarial threat was assumed to be one team for 
the existing facility analysis and new facility design (for illustration purposes) and two 
teams for the upgrades analysis (to demonstrate that a multiple team analysis could be 
undertaken on a realistic problem).  (Note that the methodology presented in Chapter V 
showed success with all example problems up to a threat of three adversary teams).  
FORM-based optimization is used; Monte Carlo based optimization is deemed too 
computationally intensive (given the results of earlier example problems) and therefore, 
not practical and not utilized as an approach to solve these problems. 
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6.3 Existing Facility Analysis 
 An analysis of the provided hypothetical facility provides the following 
safeguards plan (where a 1 indicates installation of the specified safeguard type on the 
individual arc and a 0 indicates the safeguard was not installed), where arc numbers 
correspond to those in Figure 6-6: 
 
Table 6-3: Hypothetical Facility Baseline Safeguards 
 Arc # 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 
CCTV 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
CCTV with 
Motion 
Capture 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Microwave 
Sensor 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Reinforced 
Door with 
Balanced 
Magnetic 
Switch 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Personnel 
Portal 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Vehicle 
Portal 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
On-Site 
Guard #1 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
On-Site 
Guard #2 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Reinforced 
Concrete 
Walls 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Chain Link 
Fence with 
Razor 
Wire 
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Fence 
Motion 
Sensor 
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Anti-
Vehicle 
Barrier 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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 The existing facility analysis was performed for both day and night operations in 
order to compare the results.  The cost for the baseline safeguards is $18,300,000.  The 
day PFS = .3743, while the night PFS = .503, due to a reduced guard presence. 
 
6.4 Upgrades Analysis 
 An upgrades analysis was undertaken for the facility using the existing safeguards 
plan, with a budget of $5 million for 1 and 2 teams.  This analysis resulted in the Cost vs. 
PFS plots shown in Figure 6-7.  It is interesting to note that the highest UtilityPPS 
safeguards system does not spend the entirety of the budget provided in either upgrades 
analysis.  While this was also shown in the example problems presented in Chapters IV 
and V, it is much more significant when proven on a large scale problem.  The highest 
UtilityPPS value for the single team scenario occurs at a cost of $20.3 million, whereas the 
upgrades budget allows for a total expense of $23.3 million, meaning that this 
methodology would result in a potential savings of $3 million in calculating the highest 
UtilityPPS combination of cost and performance for this threat for this facility.  In a 
practical facility, however, the facility owner may require a safeguards plan that ensures 
optimal performance given a particular budget.  In this case, the analyst can explore the 
possibility of PFS decrease due to additional safeguards expenditures using Figure 6-7. 
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Figure 6-7: Upgraded PFS Vs. Cost, Hypothetical Example 
 
6.5 New Safeguards Design 
 The results of this analysis are shown below.  The highest UtilityPPS point is found 
to be at Cost = $6.4 million, with a PFS = .060591.  This represents a significant savings 
over the baseline facility.  Two and three team analyses were attempted using the limit-
constrained multiobjective optimization method (shown in Section 4.2.1).  Even with the 
reduced computational requirement of this method, the analysis was unable to complete 
due to computational limitations due to: 1) the number of scenarios identified using 
critical path enumeration is prohibitively large to solve this problem with a multiple 
adversary team threat, and 2) the optimization algorithm used to perform the safeguards 
optimization could not efficiently perform the large scale multiobjective optimization 
required for the problem formulation in Eq. (3-3). 
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Figure 6-8: New PFS Vs. Cost, Hypothetical Example 
 
6.6 Computational Effort 
 The computational times comparing the different problem formulations are shown 
in Table 4-4.  The CPU used to run these experiments is a Dell Precision 650, 2.4 GHz 
with 1.00 GB of RAM.  As can be expected, a large-scale problem requires significantly 
computational effort (even with FORM) in order to achieve results.  With Monte Carlo 
simulation, obtaining these results would not have been possible due to the required 
computational effort. 
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Table 6-4: CPU Time Summary, Hypothetical Example 
 
CPU Time (s) 
Existing Facility Analysis 44.77 
Upgrades Analysis (1 Team) 4881 
Upgrades Analysis (2 Teams) 74,074 
New System Design 537,480 
 
 
 
6.7 Summary 
 The focus of this chapter was to assess the methodology developed throughout 
this study on a problem of real world complexity.  It was found to be successful in doing 
so using FORM, illustrating that the methodology can be used for new facility design, 
upgrades analysis, and existing facility analysis.  Monte Carlo Simulation was found to 
not be a practical method for use in this methodology. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
7.1 Summary 
 Current techniques for design and analysis of critical facility protection systems 
lack the ability to handle large scale problems, comprehensive objective functions, and 
multiple team threats.  This study makes the following contributions to these areas: 
− The methodology combines analysis techniques of adversary path analysis with 
the design capabilities of graph-theory based network interdiction, allowing for 
the development of a methodology that supports new facility design, upgrades 
analysis, and existing facility analysis. 
− The methodology develops an in-depth evaluation of system effectiveness, 
incorporating conflict between adversarial and facility guard forces and timely 
detection, concepts that were previously omitted from facility protection 
methodologies. 
− The methodology utilizes an efficient first-order reliability method based 
approach (instead of traditional Monte Carlo based methods) to incorporating 
stochastic behavior. 
− The methodology presents a novel approach to decoupling adversary critical path 
selection and safeguards optimization.   
 151 
− All of the methodological contributions of this study allow for realistic problems 
to be analyzed, although it may only be possible to analyze two or three teams at a 
larger facility.  Further, this capability is demonstrated on a realistic problem, 
which has not been possible for previous methodologies. 
− The developed single adversary team methodology is extended to a multiple team 
methodology.  This is a significant development of this study as a methodology to 
combat multiple adversary team attacks against a facility does not currently exist. 
 It is clear from the examples that existing facility analysis and upgrades analysis 
are straightforward and not computationally prohibitive.  However, the computational 
burden is significant for a new system design.  This is a result of the number of 
combinations that are generated for new safeguards analysis due to the large number of 
enumerated paths, scenarios (with multiple teams), and potential budget values.  With an 
existing facility analysis or upgrades analysis, the number of potential budget values 
drops significantly (while the other quantities remain the same), significantly reducing 
the computational effort required to perform the analysis.  FORM-based methods utilized 
in this study make new system design possible, whereas previous Monte Carlo based 
methods make the solution of large scale problems computationally impossible. 
 While the developed methodology has made several contributions to physical 
protection system design and analysis, several limitations remain.  Cost is treated 
throughout this study as a deterministic, linear variable (that is, the cost of two safeguards 
is twice as much as one safeguard, and these costs are known with 100% certainty).  Cost 
may not be certain, however, and while assuming cost is a deterministic variable is an 
appropriate first step in analysis, the methodology should be extended to include 
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uncertainty in cost.  For example, discounts exist for purchasing multiple items in bulk 
and the effects of these pricing strategies should be explored. 
 Another limitation of the proposed methodology is that the network and its 
components are considered static.  That is, their performance does not change over time.  
Of particular interest are response force and adversary actions.  The response force in this 
study was treated as having a particular patrol area.  While this is a good first estimate, in 
reality response force personnel are dynamic individuals whose patrol areas are likely to 
change as information becomes available, e.g. one guard receives a distress call from 
another guard.  This dynamic response should be incorporated through agent based 
modeling.  Adversary actions are assumed to be known based on adversary paths, but 
realistic scenarios involve adversaries potentially changing paths during their attack. 
Agent based modeling can also be utilized to model adversary actions. 
 A final limitation of this methodology is that it addresses only sabotage scenarios 
that require access to the sabotage target.  This methodology does not consider theft 
scenarios or scenarios in which sabotage may occur at a distance (i.e. detonating a bomb 
at the perimeter of a facility that damages a building inside the facility).  These scenarios 
should be explored in future work. 
 Additionally, the following section discusses areas that are not limitations of the 
current methodology, but could be explored for future work. 
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7.2 Future Work 
 While this study has made significant progress in the area of facility protection 
optimization uncertainty, there are several extensions that should be explored in future 
work: 
− Input data should be analyzed before implementing this methodology.  One 
possible approach for this would be through elicitation of expert opinion.  Experts 
can help to quantify some of the unknown parameters that are used in the model, 
such as the simultaneous team time factor.  Additionally, if possible, it is 
suggested that the methodology’s assumptions (i.e. STTF or HTTF) be tested 
experimentally (i.e. comparing a sample task completion time for multiple teams 
with a single team).  While this work may be classified, its findings could prove 
to be very important in proving this methodology to be useful. 
− Further development of critical path enumeration techniques should be explored.  
A smaller number of critical paths for large scale scenarios could significantly 
reduce the computational burden of this methodology on larger problems.  
− Potential insider attacks need to be included in this methodology.  While a 
significant amount of work has been done to design physical protection systems to 
prevent outsider attacks, the disabling of a particular PPS component by an 
insider may render the system useless.  Additionally, insiders can perform crimes 
over extended timelines, such as stealing extremely small portions of a nuclear 
material over a period of time of many years.  Defending against this type of 
attack is significantly different.  A methodology needs to be developed to balance 
cost and performance of defending against both insider and outsider attacks. 
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− Finally, other problem types may be explored using the presented methodology. 
The first potential application is with respect to the US Border Control Initiative.  
In order to do this, the problem could be set up similar to the facility protection 
problem, which the exception being that the acceptable throughput for a border 
control system would not have to be zero (as it is in the methodology presented in 
this study).  Security systems for other facilities such as airports, ports, etc. may 
also be explored as potential avenues for further use of this methodology.  All 
three of these suggested applications are natural candidates for graph theory based 
representations given their distributed geographic layouts. 
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